

PAYING THE PRICE:



**The Impact of Immigration
Raids on America's Children**

The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) – the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States – works to improve opportunities for Hispanic Americans. Through its network of nearly 300 affiliated community-based organizations (CBOs), NCLR reaches millions of Hispanics each year in 41 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. To achieve its mission, NCLR conducts applied research, policy analysis, and advocacy, providing a Latino perspective in five key areas – assets/investments, civil rights/immigration, education, employment and economic status, and health. In addition, it provides capacity-building assistance to its Affiliates who work at the state and local level to advance opportunities for individuals and families.

Founded in 1968, NCLR is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan, tax-exempt organization headquartered in Washington, DC. NCLR serves all Hispanic subgroups in all regions of the country and has operations in Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Antonio, and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

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Paying the Price:

The Impact of Immigration Raids on America's Children

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A Report by The Urban Institute

For the National Council of La Raza

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Foreword



One of our society's fundamental principles is that, to the extent possible, children should not be punished for the sins of their parents. This principle has deep roots in both religion and law. Many of the world's great religions share similar teachings. And, from a legal perspective, when our nation was created, the value that children's futures should not be based on their parents' social status helped to shape the world's leading democracy.

Our child welfare system reflects this fundamental principle. If a child is endangered by abuse or neglect, our society steps in to safeguard the best interests of the child. And while there is clearly room for improvement in the child welfare system, there is little controversy about the rationale for the system's existence; few disagree that children deserve protection.

Like many morally sound policies, adherence to this principle has practical benefits as well. It happens to be in our long-term social and economic interest to minimize harm to children. Research demonstrates that abused and neglected children are less likely to become productive and well-adjusted adults. Thus, it's a good investment for taxpayers when we step in to ensure that children are protected.

This principle – and a core value of our democracy – is currently under assault. In recent months, the Department of Homeland Security has launched a series of raids that have resulted in the forcible separation of children from parents accused of violating our immigration laws.

Issues of immigration are fraught with emotion, which is perhaps fitting in this “nation of immigrants.” While the emotion in this debate is understandable, the question is not whether to enforce immigration laws but how. It is critically important to focus policy-

maker attention on the fact that there are conflicting principles involved, and thus significant policy choices to be made. Enforcement resources are not unlimited, and a wise administration will make considered judgments about how best to make use of finite resources for the good of the nation. Presumably, this requires some assessment of the benefits of our enforcement priorities as compared to their costs. This study is the first significant attempt to assess the costs of these enforcement choices on innocent children, the most vulnerable members of our society.

The National Council of La Raza's desire to stimulate a more thoughtful policy conversation on enforcement priorities is our motivation for investing in this study, and for seeking a well-respected research institution to conduct it. We asked the Urban Institute to design a study that assesses the impact of immigration raids on children and families and the institutions that support them, such as early childhood education centers and school systems. Their findings help remove the issue from the hyperbole which often surrounds it, and the report outlines implications for children, families, and communities.

The results are striking. The number of children separated from one or both parents as a result of immigration enforcement is significant; the study found that for every two immigrants apprehended, one child was left behind. This suggests that potentially thousands of children have been separated from their parents as a result of recent immigration enforcement activities, and literally millions more may be at risk. The study found that fully two-thirds of affected children are U.S. citizens or legal residents, suggesting that the potential future costs for our country are significant. In addition, the Urban Institute found that the impact on the social structures that support children was profoundly negative. Surely Americans should be concerned when one of the effects of enforcing the law is that school systems and child care providers must prepare for the likelihood of substantial numbers of their children being left without care, without warning.

The Urban Institute's results suggest that there is an urgent need for Congress and the Administration to review the nation's immigration enforcement priorities and undertake a more careful analysis of the costs of the choices we make. If our immigration enforcement strategy undermines the health and well-being of America's children and the structures designed to protect and nurture them, it is time to reconsider our priorities.

Janet Murguía
President and CEO
National Council of La Raza

Acknowledgments



This report represents a collaborative effort between the Urban Institute and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) to better understand how many children are potentially at risk of having a parent deported and/or detained as a result of worksite enforcement actions and the potential impact of such actions on these children. The authors of this study are Urban Institute researchers Randy Capps, Rosa Maria Castañeda, Ajay Chaudry, and Robert Santos. The views and conclusions included herein are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of NCLR, the Urban Institute, or their funders.

The authors thank Joe Hammell and Kathleen Moccio of Dorsey & Whitney LLP in Minneapolis for reviewing drafts of the report and providing their perspective on the legal issues involved.

NCLR staff who contributed to the completion of this publication include Miriam Calderón, Associate Director, Policy Analysis Center; Flavia Jiménez, Senior Immigration Policy Analyst; Catherine Han Montoya, Emerging Latino Communities Program Coordinator; Michele Waslin, Director of Immigration Policy Research; and Cecilia Muñoz, Senior Vice President. In addition, Jennifer Kadis, Director of Quality Control; Nancy Wilberg, Assistant Editor; Jackeline Stewart, Copy Editor; and Ofelia Ardón-Jones, Production Manager/Senior Design Specialist of Graphics & Design were responsible for shepherding the report through the production process.

NCLR and the Urban Institute extend their gratitude to Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition, Nebraska Appleseed, and El Comité and Congregations Building Communities in Colorado, the four intermediary organizations who were instrumental in connecting Urban Institute researchers with key community contacts as well as with parents and other caregivers in the study sites. Without their assistance, the study would not have been possible. We also thank all of the community contacts in the sites for their time and expertise. The parents and other caregivers interviewed for the study shared personal, often painful, stories. Their accounts are the most important data supporting the findings in this report.

Finally, NCLR acknowledges the generous support of its funders. Foremost, this report was made possible through The Atlantic Philanthropies' support of NCLR's Latino Children's Advocacy Project. The Annie E. Casey Foundation provided additional assistance for report production, and the Foundation for Child Development supported the study's release. In addition, core support for NCLR's Policy Analysis Center is provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

The photos included in this report represent the many faces of America's children. Marlene Hawthorne Thomas, NCLR, contributed photos she took of students at Mary's Center/Education Strengthens Families (ESF) Public Charter School in Washington, DC. Additional photos were provided by photographer Susie Fitzhugh (those on pages iii, 1, 9, 15, 33, 41, and 55 are © Susie Fitzhugh). The cover photo was included with the permission of Peter Pereira, a photographer for the *Standard-Times*. This image of Baby Tomasa crying in the arms of her mother was taken during the immigration raid that occurred in New Bedford, Massachusetts in March 2007. It has become a symbol of the pain and suffering of the thousands of children who have lived through this ordeal.

I. Executive Summary



There are approximately five million U.S. children with at least one undocumented parent. The recent intensification of immigration enforcement activities by the federal government has increasingly put these children at risk of family separation, economic hardship, and psychological trauma. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the interior enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the federal agency charged with enforcing immigration laws, has markedly increased the pace of worksite raids in the past few years to apprehend undocumented immigrants: the number of undocumented immigrants arrested at workplaces increased more than sevenfold from 500 to 3,600 between 2002 and 2006. These actions are part of intensified enforcement activities, including deportation of immigrants who have committed crimes; door-to-door operations to arrest immigrants with deportation orders; and large-scale raids of suspected undocumented immigrants' worksites. With the collapse of comprehensive immigration reform in Congress, and the all but certain appropriation of additional enforcement resources to ICE, it is likely that the number of worksite actions will continue to increase.

The primary goal of this paper is to go beyond the human interest stories reported in the media and provide a factual basis for discussing the impact of worksite enforcement operations on children with undocumented parents. The study focuses on children because they have strong claims to the protection of society, especially when they are citizens and integrated into their schools and communities, and the United States is the only country they have known and consider home. They also warrant our attention because they are emotionally, financially, and developmentally dependent on their parents' care, protection, and earnings.

The findings discussed in this report are based on a study of three communities that experienced large-scale worksite raids within the past year: Greeley, Colorado; Grand Island, Nebraska; and New Bedford, Massachusetts. In each location Urban Institute staff met with employers, lawyers, religious leaders, public social service agencies, nonprofit agencies, community leaders, and others to discuss the immediate aftermath of the raids, as well as the potential longer-term impact on children. Parents, including some released from ICE detention, and other caregivers of affected children were interviewed individually.

Greeley and Grand Island were two of the six sites in which Swift & Company meatpacking plants were raided. New Bedford was the site of a raid on Michael Bianco, Inc., a textile manufacturing facility that makes backpacks for the U.S. military. In all three sites the vast majority of workers arrested were from Mexico, Guatemala, or other Latin American countries. The findings in this report, however, may also be applicable to children with undocumented parents from other regions of the world, as about 22% of all undocumented immigrants in the nation come from regions other than Latin America.

Number of children affected. On average, the number of children affected by worksite raids is about half the number of adults arrested. Over 900 adults were arrested in the three study sites, and the parents among them collectively had just over 500 children.

A large majority of the children affected are U.S. citizens and the youngest and most vulnerable in our society – infants, toddlers, and preschoolers. In one site, two-thirds of the children were citizens – matching national data. In two of the sites, 79% and 88% (respectively) of children were ages ten and younger. In one site, more than half of the children were ages five and younger.

Immediate impact on children. ICE's processing and detention procedures made it difficult to arrange care for children when parents were arrested. Many arrestees signed voluntary departure papers and left the country before they could contact immigration lawyers, their families, or – in one of the sites – their home country consulates. Detained immigrants had very limited access to telephones to communicate with their families, and many were moved to remote detention facilities out of the states in which they were arrested. Some single parents and other primary caregivers were released late on the same day as the raids, but others were held overnight or for several days. Many of the arrested parents were afraid to divulge that they had children because they believed that ICE would take their children into custody as well.

In the days and weeks following the raids, informal family and community networks took on significant caregiving responsibilities and economic support of children. Families faced major economic instability as their incomes plunged following the arrest of working parents, usually the primary breadwinners. The most important immediate needs were food, baby formula, diapers, clothing, and other necessities. Families were generally reluctant to go to state or private agencies to ask for assistance due to fears of additional arrests of family members, be they adults or children. Many families hid in their homes – in some cases in basements or closets – for days and weeks on end.

On the day of the raids, school districts in all three sites were effective in ensuring that children were not dropped off to empty homes or left at school overnight, but some children walked to empty homes. The Grand Island school district implemented a plan to contact every child whose parents worked at the Swift plant and to determine adult supervision for them. Because of the efforts of school district officials and extended family and community networks, no young children were left behind in school, left at home without adult supervision, or taken into foster care. Some adolescents, however, were left in the company of other teenagers and children for days and even weeks. Some younger children remained in the care of babysitters for weeks or months.

Longer-term impact. Many parents were deported within a few days of their arrest, and in such cases families had to make arrangements depending on whether the arrested parent could eventually reenter the United States legally or would be willing to face the grave risks involved with attempting illegal reentry at some point in the future. Other parents were held in detention for months, and only released after paying substantial bonds (up to \$10,000), or not released at all before their deportation. During the time these parents were held, their children and other family members experienced significant hardship, including difficulty coping with the economic and psychological stress caused by the arrest and the uncertainty of not knowing when or if the arrested parent would be released.

Hardship increased over time, as families' meager savings and funds from previous paychecks were spent. Privately funded assistance generally lasted for two to three months, but many parents were detained for up to five or six months, and others were released but waited for several months for a final appearance before an immigration judge – during which time they could not work. Hardship also increased among extended families and nonfamily networks over time, as they took on more and more responsibility for taking care of children with arrested parents.

After the arrest or disappearance of their parents, children experienced feelings of abandonment and showed symptoms of emotional trauma, psychological duress, and mental health problems. Many lacked stability in child care and supervision. Families continued hiding and feared arrest if they ventured outside, increasing social isolation over time. Immigrant communities faced the fear of future raids, backlash from nonimmigrants, and the stigma of being labeled “illegal.” The combination of fear, isolation, and economic hardship induced mental health problems such as depression, separation anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal thoughts. However, due to cultural reasons, fear of possible consequences in asking for assistance, and barriers to accessing services, few affected immigrants sought mental health care for themselves or their children.

Community responses. In all three study sites, community leaders and institutions initiated intensive and broad response efforts to assist immigrant families after the raids. Religious institutions emerged as central distribution points for relief because they were considered “safe” by families, had space to hold functions and deliver services, provided a natural outreach avenue, were not threatening to other service providers, and could provide some assistance without “strings attached.” But in the long run, church-based assistance was not sustainable due to the limited capacity of infrastructure and staff.

Other private social service delivery systems also played important roles. In Grand Island and Greeley, Swift & Company provided substantial assistance through United Way agencies, and in New Bedford, the Community Foundation of Southeastern Massachusetts funded efforts facilitated by the Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy (MIRA) Coalition, a statewide organization.

The presence of trusted membership organizations and coalitions with a focus on immigrant issues facilitated response efforts in New Bedford and Grand Island. In Grand Island, a number of state agencies and local leaders had previous experience with a raid in 1992, and they stepped forward to organize the response. But in Greeley, difficulties in coordinating services and obtaining the names of arrested family members – along with a major snowstorm about a week after the raid – delayed the response effort.

Local leadership, service delivery capacity, and cultural competence also emerged as critical factors in enhancing community responses, yet not all of these were present in all three sites following the raids. Small Latino community-based organizations (CBOs) played leading roles in relief efforts, but few featured strengths across all these

dimensions. Recent immigrant groups such as the Maya Kiche from Guatemala had limited leadership experience and needed support from outside groups.

State and local public health and social service agencies had varying levels of community trust and involvement in response efforts across the sites. The Massachusetts Department of Social Services (Massachusetts DSS) sent 35 workers to detention centers in Texas to interview detainees; they were successful in obtaining the release of 20 single parents who were held there. Through this effort, Massachusetts DSS attained direct contact with some affected families and gained their trust. In Greeley, by contrast, the county social service agency was not a trusted site for relief efforts due to a recent state law requiring that immigrants providing false documents be reported to the authorities. In Grand Island, a recent child welfare case – in which an immigrant parent lost her child and was deported – had broken trust between the agency and the community.

In all three sites, social service agencies sent staff to churches shortly after the raid to assist affected families, and they stationed staff at churches and other service delivery locations temporarily. Despite outreach efforts and the fact that U.S.-citizen children are eligible for a wide range of public benefits and services, few families sought public assistance in any of the three sites following the raids.

Nongovernmental service providers also faced trust issues with the affected families, which complicated service delivery. In Grand Island, ICE's ongoing door-to-door operations and arrests of immigrants in their homes maintained a high level of fear in the community for weeks, and families there would not even go to church or open the door for community leaders who brought them food baskets.

In all three sites, there was substantial paperwork associated with verifying that families seeking assistance were related to immigrants arrested at the worksites. Verification procedures substantially delayed delivery of aid in Greeley because it took more than two weeks to get a full and accurate list of arrestees from ICE.

The location where the major forms of assistance were distributed affected the delivery of services following the raids. In general, providing services in multiple locations such as religious and grassroots community organizations and going door to door was more effective than opening a central distribution point and waiting for families to seek assistance there.

Conclusions and recommendations. Children are vulnerable members of society; thus, the United States, like most other nations, has developed systems to protect them. These systems are designed to meet children's basic needs such as food, shelter, and health care, and to keep them safe from psychological and physical harm. Yet, these systems cannot replace parents when they are taken away from their children. Current U.S. immigration policy mandates the arrest of undocumented parents, and by extension causes separation of parents from children.

The U.S. government has largely been silent about the impact of these raids on children, and ICE has yet to acknowledge fully that worksite enforcement operations have harmful and long-lasting consequences for families. In fact, ICE has not issued public guidelines or regulations concerning the treatment of parents during their arrest, detention, and deportation.

Beyond the broad concern about the lack of protection for children following worksite enforcement operations, the research also raised many specific concerns about the conduct of worksite raids and community responses to them. The following is a brief list of the recommendations drawn from the study; the full list is available at the end of section VIII, "Conclusions and Recommendations," of this report:

- Congress should provide oversight of immigration enforcement activities to ensure that children are protected during worksite enforcement and other operations.
- ICE should assume that there will always be children – generally very young children – affected whenever adults are arrested in worksite enforcement operations, and should develop a consistent policy for parents' release. Single parents and primary caregivers of young children should be released early enough in the day so that their children do not experience disruptions in care; they should not be held overnight.
- ICE should provide detainees access to counsel and advise them of their right to confer with their country's consular office. Detainees should be allowed access to telephones, and the confidentiality of their telephone conversations should be ensured.
- Schools should develop systems to help ensure that children have a safe place to go in the event of a raid, and to reduce the risk that children will be left without adult supervision when the school day ends.
- Social service and other public agencies should prepare plans to respond to immigration raids and develop outreach strategies to assure parents and other caregivers that it is safe to seek emergency assistance and benefits for children under such circumstances.

- Churches and other religious institutions should be considered central points of communication, distribution of assistance, and outreach to families affected by immigration enforcement operations.
- Social services and economic assistance need to be provided over a prolonged period of time – often many months – until parents are released from detention and their immigration cases are resolved. Longer-term counseling for children and their parents to mitigate psychological impacts may also be necessary.
- Relatives, friends, community leaders, and service providers should develop plans for immigrant families in the event of a single parent's or primary caregiver's arrest and be ready to provide ICE with necessary documentation for a parent's release.
- Immigration lawyers, advocates, community leaders, and others should be honest with arrested immigrants about their chances of remaining in the United States, and strategic in choosing which cases to fight. Arrested immigrants should not have to pay large legal fees if their cases have a low probability of success, especially when they are already facing substantial economic hardship.
- A clearinghouse of information about responses to raids should be developed nationally. Such a clearinghouse could be a repository for stories about raids, a conduit for sharing information, and a setting for developing best practices in service delivery.

II. Introduction



The United States has reached a crossroads in its immigration policy and enforcement strategies. With at least 11 million estimated undocumented immigrants in the country,¹ there is mounting pressure on Congress and the DHS to resolve the status of immigrants and to create an immigration system that is fair and orderly. Some in Congress have pursued various legislative strategies that would grant permanent legal status to the 11 million or more undocumented individuals currently residing in the United States. Others have proposed granting temporary work permits, which would at least allow these immigrants to stay in the country legally for a period of a few years. But these measures have failed to pass the full Congress, leaving millions of immigrants without any form of legal status – or basic rights in the country – and vulnerable to arrest, detention, and deportation at any time.

Most of the children of undocumented immigrants are birthright citizens, and the rights of U.S. citizens extend to these children, along with the obligations of the U.S. government, other public institutions, and private actors in our society to protect them. Recent estimates suggest that there are about five million children in the United States who have one or more undocumented parents. Two-thirds of these children – more than three million – are U.S.-born citizens.² Under current law these children are just as vulnerable to immigration enforcement as their parents. While they cannot be deported themselves, the arrest, detention, and possible deportation of one or more parents have potentially great immediate and longer-term impact on these children.

Worksite enforcement is different from other immigration enforcement activities in several important ways, having negative short- and long-term implications for families and children. Worksite raids occur all over the country – not just near the border.

Generally, immigrants arrested in worksite raids have no prior criminal history or immigration-related arrests. Worksite raids by definition are aimed at people working in the country illegally, and the offenses for which they are arrested include unauthorized work and at times use of false Social Security numbers. For those who have been in the country working for many years – which includes the bulk of the immigrants included in this study – arrests arguably cause great shock and disturbance, and the instability following the arrest of parents can negatively affect children in all aspects of their lives – economically, psychologically, and otherwise.

BACKGROUND ON DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

DHS is one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the world. Every year DHS arrests more than 1.6 million immigrants; the vast majority of them are arrested along or near the Southwest border with Mexico.³ Further into the interior of the United States, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducts operations that net thousands of immigrants every year under a variety of enforcement strategies. Through “Operation Return to Sender,” for instance, ICE arrested almost 20,000 undocumented immigrant fugitives in federal fiscal year (FY) 2006.⁴ “Criminal aliens” – those immigrants convicted of criminal charges within the United States – are arrested in even larger numbers. Since 1996, when new criminal deportation provisions were enacted in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, more than 650,000 immigrants – both undocumented and legal noncitizens – have been deported as criminal aliens, many after serving substantial prison time. In both FY 2004 and FY 2005 more than 90,000 immigrants were deported as criminal aliens.⁵ To meet the needs of its various investigation, law enforcement, detention, and deportation operations, ICE’s budget is \$4.7 billion for FY 2007.⁶


There has been an increased focus on worksite enforcement within DHS and ICE, but the number of worksite arrests is still small relative to other interior enforcement activities. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor agency to ICE, arrested very few undocumented immigrants at worksites during the late 1990s through 2002. But since its creation in 2003, ICE has “dramatically enhanced its efforts to combat the unlawful employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”⁷ Between FY 2002 – the last full year INS was in operation – and FY 2006, the number of worksite administrative arrests increased more than sevenfold, from fewer than 500 to more than 3,600 (Figure 1). During the first ten months of FY 2007 (October 2006 through July 2007), there were more than 3,600 administrative arrests and more than 700 criminal arrests – about as many as during all of FY 2006.

ICE's new emphasis on worksite enforcement has resulted in large-scale sweeping operations in many states, as well as many much smaller operations. In December 2006, as part of "Operation Wagon Train," more than 1,000 ICE agents raided six Swift & Company meatpacking plants; ICE also arrested 1,297 immigrants under administrative charges and another 274 persons – both immigrants and U.S.-born natives – on criminal charges.⁸ Two of these Swift raid sites were visited for this study. Since the raid on Michael Bianco, Inc. in New Bedford in March – the last of the three operations discussed in this report – there have been worksite enforcement actions in at least nine states, with more than 700 immigrants arrested.⁹ Almost all of the immigrants arrested in these raids were Latinos – primarily from Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras – but nationally almost a quarter of undocumented immigrants are from regions of the world other than Latin America. In some other worksite raids, arrested immigrants may not have been predominantly Latinos.

ICE's detention capacity has also increased to accommodate the growing number of arrests from worksite and other operations. On any given day in FY 2006, ICE detention facilities housed almost 20,000 immigrants, a 10% increase over FY 2005. There are large and growing numbers of deportations as well. In FY 2006, ICE formally deported more

FIGURE 1

**U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Worksite Arrests,
Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007**



Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Worksite Enforcement Overview." Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007. Available at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm>.

than 185,000 immigrants from the United States.¹⁰ However large these numbers may seem, these deportations amounted to less than 2% of the estimated 11 million immigrants in the country without authorization.

STUDY GOALS

The primary goal of this paper is to go beyond the human interest stories reported in the media and provide a factual basis for discussing the impact of worksite enforcement actions on children with undocumented parents. The study focuses on children because they have strong claims to the protection of society, especially when they are citizens and integrated into their schools and communities, and the United States is the only country they have known and consider home. They also warrant our attention because they are emotionally, financially, and developmentally dependent on their parents' care, protection, and earnings.

A secondary goal is to draw attention to the ground-level experiences of immigrant families and communities following the raids and use these experiences to understand how the raids have affected families and communities. This report also includes a concrete set of recommendations for policy changes, planning, and organizing to mitigate the impact of future raids on children and communities.

To this end, the study addresses the following key questions:

- **Number of children affected.** How many children have parents who have been arrested in worksite enforcement actions? What are the ages of these children, and how many are U.S.-born citizens?
- **Immediate impact on children.** What are the immediate physical, emotional, and psychological effects of the raids on children? Who cares for children on the day of a raid and what happens to them in the days that follow? How are their basic needs for supervision, food, and shelter met? What is the impact of separation from their parents? What happens with children's schooling?
- **Longer-term impact on children.** Over the longer term, do families remain in the same communities or relocate elsewhere in the United States or abroad? If a parent is deported, does the child move with the parent or remain with another parent or caregiver? How do families make decisions about moving or staying, and what are the implications of their decisions for children?
- ◆ How do family circumstances and caregiving arrangements change during the intervening period between when a raid occurs and when parents are released from detention and deported? What housing, employment, and economic conditions do

the families face while the parent is detained, when they are released on bond and waiting adjudication, and once their case is decided?

- ◆ How do increased fear in immigrant communities and backlash from nonimmigrants affect children psychologically?
- ◆ What are the potential longer-term consequences for children's development?
- **Community responses.** How have state and local public agencies, nonprofit service providers, faith-based organizations, community leaders, schools, and other people and institutions responded to the raids? What types of assistance are provided, and what needs are left unmet? What seem to be the most effective response models or strategies? What are the key challenges in delivering services to families and children?
- **Lessons learned and recommendations.** What lessons can be learned from community responses to the raids in anticipation of similar raids in the future? What recommendations can be made for public agencies, private organizations, and immigrant communities to prepare for future raids? What recommendations can be made for ICE and the federal court system adjudicating the cases?

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Following a brief description of the methodology, the report discusses the number of people arrested in the three raids covered by the study along with the numbers and characteristics of children in arrestees' families. Next, the report discusses what actually happened on the day of the raids in each site, and what happened to the people who were arrested. Following is a section discussing the immediate impact of the raids on children in terms of their caregiving arrangements, schooling, and basic economic needs. Longer-term consequences – economic, social, and psychological – are discussed in a separate section. The next section describes the social service responses of the three communities visited for the study. Implications for future responses to immigration raids are discussed throughout the report in text boxes at the end of each substantive section; vignettes and stories about affected families are also described in text boxes. Conclusions and recommendations are provided as the last substantive section of the report. Four appendices follow: (1) a detailed description of the methodology; (2) summary of the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the sites; (3) description, in systematic detail, of the community responses to the raids in the three study sites; and (4) detailed estimates of the number of children in undocumented families nationally, regionally, by country of origin, and by parent occupation.

METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted in a short time frame – about four months from April through July 2007 – and is exploratory and preliminary in nature. Site visits were conducted in three communities within two to six months after large-scale worksite raids had taken place. Thus, the study covers only the short- and intermediate-term impact on children and the communities' responses to the raids. Some findings and hypotheses about potential longer-term effects on children were also explored in the study; however, a comprehensive assessment of longer-term consequences must be left to a follow-up study with a longer time frame. The impact on children who left the country with their parents or other caregivers was beyond the purview of this study.

In each site, information was obtained directly from immigrants who were arrested, their spouses, and other family members. Immigrant community leaders, employers, and public and private agency staff who provided relief following the raids were also interviewed. Semistructured interview guides were used to collect standardized information from site to site and among respondents; these guides also allowed for open-ended discussions with respondents. Data on the number of children directly affected were collected, when possible, from each site. National figures on children of undocumented immigrants and their characteristics were obtained using data from the March 2005 U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), enhanced by Urban Institute assignments of legal status to noncitizens in the survey. The methodology is described in more detail in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

The three study sites were all selected based on large-scale ICE worksite enforcement actions within six months before the site visits. The raids were conducted in manufacturing plants that are major employers. The sites were similar in size and included a substantial number of Latino immigrants, but the demographics of Latino populations differed across the locales, as did their residential and employment patterns. Although the report focuses on sites where virtually all of the arrested immigrants were from Latin America, the findings may also be applicable to children with undocumented parents from other regions of the world.¹¹ Appendix 2 describes the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of each of the three study sites in more detail.

III. Number of Children Affected



Understanding the scope of the impact of worksite enforcement actions on children and families requires data or estimates of the number of children potentially and actually affected. Unfortunately, there are no hard numbers on the undocumented population, as it is largely clandestine and difficult to survey; data on the number of ICE arrestees with children are also lacking. Absent such exact data, this section draws on two of the best available sources: national survey data from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), and data obtained during the course of the study's three site visits.

Nationally, there are almost five million children with at least one undocumented parent, and about half as many children as undocumented working-age adults. From the site visits, the best available information suggests that at least 506 children were directly affected by the arrest of at least one parent. This is more than half of the total number of arrestees (912).

NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN UNDOCUMENTED FAMILIES

While employer enforcement actions may deter the employment of undocumented adults, the unavoidable consequences of such actions include putting the well-being of children at risk. Nationally, about half of all working-age undocumented adults have at least one child. On average, one child is likely to be affected for every two workers arrested, if the demographics of undocumented workers arrested match the national data.

Nationally, the ratio of children to working-age undocumented adults (ages 18 to 64) was 53% in 2005. There were 9.3 million undocumented working-age adults and 4.9 million children (ages 0-17) living with these adults (Table 1).¹² About half (48%) of undocumented working-age adults had children. Three-quarters of undocumented families with children had two parents in the home, and there were two children on average per family.*

TABLE 1

National Estimates of Undocumented Working-Age Adults and Their Children, 2005

Number of adults (ages 18-64)	9,281,000
Number of adults with children (ages 0-17)	4,483,000
Percentage of adults with children	48%
Average children per parent	1.1
Average children per family	2.0
Total number of children (ages 0-17)	4,925,000
Ratio of children to adults	53%
Percentage of children:	
U.S.-born citizens	64%
Ages 0 to 5	37%
Ages 6 to 10	28%
Ages 11 to 17	35%

Note: Estimates are inflated by about 10% to adjust for undercounting in the Current Population Survey, as are the most recent and widely accepted estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center. See Passel, Jeffrey S., *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey*. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2006.

Source: Urban Institute analysis of March 2005 U.S. Current Population Survey data, augmented with assignments of legal status to noncitizens.

Thus, based on national data, one would expect that the number of children affected by raids would be equal to about half the number of adults arrested. Moreover, as undocumented families have two children on average, there are multiple children affected in most families. However, there are likely to be differences across our study sites based on the demographics of immigrants there and other characteristics. Potential reasons for variation across the sites are discussed in detail in Appendix 4.

* See Appendix 4 for further details.

Hundreds of other children were also affected because they lived in extended households with the arrested immigrants; families who were directly affected moved in with them; or they felt the psychological impact of the raids on the whole immigrant community. These children are not reflected in the estimates included in this report.

Citizenship of children. The majority of children in undocumented families are U.S.-born citizens; therefore, worksite enforcement actions are affecting a large number of citizens in addition to undocumented immigrants. The U.S. Constitution declares that children born in the United States are citizens by birthright. In 2005, almost two-thirds (64%) of children with undocumented working-age parents were U.S.-born citizens (Table 1).

The majority of younger children with undocumented parents were U.S.-born citizens, but most adolescents were foreign-born and therefore undocumented, like their parents. In 2005, 84% of children under age six were U.S.-born citizens, compared with 63% of children ages six to ten, and just 44% of children ages 11 to 17. As a result, in many cases worksite raids are affecting both citizen and noncitizen children within the same families.

Ages of children. Worksite enforcement actions are also affecting a large number of the most vulnerable members of society – the youngest children. The children of undocumented immigrants are predominantly young children, and many are infants, toddlers, and preschoolers. In 2005, more than a third (37%) were ages five and younger, and almost two-thirds (65%) were ages ten and younger.¹³ Because so many of the children of undocumented parents are very young, child care arrangements are likely to be critical in the aftermath of worksite raids. Moreover, schools cannot be the only or primary focus of response efforts, because only about two-thirds of the children affected are likely to be old enough to be in school.

IMPLICATIONS

The almost five million children with undocumented parents in the United States are at risk of adverse consequences if their parents are arrested in worksite or other immigration enforcement actions. The small number of worksite arrests so far – just a few thousand – has directly affected only a small fraction of the children potentially at risk.

ESTIMATES OF CHILDREN AFFECTED IN THE STUDY SITES

There were 506 children (collectively) whose parents were arrested in the three sites (912 total arrested adults). The ratio of children to arrested adults ranged from about three children for every four adults in Greeley to just under one to three in New Bedford.

Although only three sites were chosen for the study – and they are by no means representative of all the worksite enforcement actions that have taken place recently – data from the sites fall into line with the national data, suggesting that there are a little more than half as many affected children as adults. But there was great variation in the number of children from site to site, suggesting that some raids have significantly more impact on children than others. There were more children per arrested adult in Greeley and Grand Island than in New Bedford, most likely because New Bedford arrestees were younger, were more likely to come from Guatemala and other Central American countries, and were earning lower wages; these factors are discussed in more detail in Appendix 4.

Number of children with arrested parents. The sites in Greeley and Grand Island each had about 275 arrests (Table 2). In Greeley, according to service providers interviewed for the study, 90 households with children and at least one arrested worker received services. Assuming there was one arrestee per household, amounting to about one-third of arrestees with children, these households had a collective total of 201 children, or 2.2 children on average per household. In Greeley there were approximately three children for every four arrested adults.

In Grand Island, a similar number of children with arrested parents (192) were in families that sought services, but no information was available on how many adults or families with children sought services. The ratio of children to arrestees in Grand Island was more than two children per every three arrestees (69%), just below the ratio in Greeley.*

New Bedford had fewer adults with children, despite the larger number of overall arrestees (361). In this site, only 78 arrestees (22%) had children, and the total number of children was 113. Those arrestees with children had only 1.4 children on average in New Bedford, compared with 2.2 in Greeley. The ratio of children to arrestees was just under one child for every three arrestees (31%) in New Bedford, less than half that of the other two sites. The data we obtained from the first two sites likely undercounted the number of children affected because they are based on reports by service providers. However, in New Bedford, the data are complete.

Citizenship of children. Data on the U.S.-citizen share of children were obtained only for Greeley. At this site, 66% of children were citizens, consistent with national data. Given

* The figures on the number of children affected in the first and second sites are based on records of households that received services and had at least one parent arrested, verified against a list provided by the swift of company. Because not all families with children sought services, these numbers are likely underestimates.

TABLE 2

**Numbers of Arrestees and Children of Arrestees for the
Three Study Sites**

	Greeley	Grand Island	New Bedford
Total workers arrested*	273	278	361
Number with children	90	N/A	78
Share with children (ages 0-17)	33%	N/A	22%
Average number of children	2.2	N/A	1.4
Number of children	201	192	113
Ratio of children to arrestees	74%	69%	31%
Percentage of children:			
U.S.-born citizens	66%	N/A	N/A
Ages 0 to 5	N/A	44%	71%
Ages 6 to 10	N/A	35%	17%
Ages 11 to 17	N/A	21%	12%
Geographic region of the U.S.	West	Midwest	Northeast
Predominant countries of origin of arrestees	Mexico Guatemala	Guatemala Mexico	Guatemala Honduras El Salvador

* Includes all those officially reported as arrested by ICE, some of whom were arrested at locations other than the primary facility that was raided.

Sources: Greeley and Grand Island data are based on information obtained from service providers and therefore may undercount the number of children affected as not all arrestees or families sought services. New Bedford data are based on a comprehensive list of arrestees and their family members compiled by state and local advocates and service providers.

the higher share of Guatemalan arrestees in Grand Island and New Bedford – and the fact that a higher share of children with Guatemalan than Mexican parents are citizens (Appendix 4) – one would expect the citizen share of children to be higher in these two sites, but no data were obtained.

Ages of children. Data on children's ages were obtained for Grand Island and New Bedford, and in both sites large majorities were age ten and younger. In Grand Island, 44% of children were under six years old, and another 35% were age six to ten. Just 21% were ages 11 to 17. Children were much younger in New Bedford: 71% were under six, and 17% were age six to ten. Only 12% were age 11 to 17, not counting the four arrestees

IMPLICATIONS

Arresting undocumented immigrants from worksites inevitably affects children. On average, there are likely to be about half as many children as adults affected by worksite enforcement actions. But there is likely to be great variation among worksite operations, as the share of children varies with immigrants' age, country of origin, and other factors.

who were themselves minors. In fact, a large number of the children in New Bedford were infants and toddlers, and a dozen pregnant women were arrested. The relatively young ages of the children in New Bedford – relative to Grand Island and the national data presented earlier – are most likely due to the same factors associated with fewer children in this site, especially the younger average age of arrestees (Appendix 4).*

* Nationally, in 2005 the age distribution of children in undocumented families was 37% under age six, 28% ages six to ten, and 35% ages 11 to 17.

IV. Worksite Enforcement Actions in the Study Sites



The central focus of this report is on the impact of the ICE worksite raids on children at the three study sites. These raids were large in scale and had a dramatic and long-lasting impact on the communities in which they were conducted. Arrested immigrants often experienced long and difficult periods of detention and uncertainty about their future. To understand the impact on children, it is important to first review how the raids were conducted and how arrested immigrants flowed through the ICE system of detention, release, appeal, and deportation following the raids. The discussion of these issues in this section of the report is not meant to be exhaustive, but only to provide a context for our later discussion of the impact of the raids on children and services provided to them.

THE DAY OF THE RAIDS

Greeley, Grand Island, and New Bedford experienced among the largest worksite enforcement actions that ICE – or any U.S. immigration authority – has ever conducted. They involved a large-scale show of force with hundreds of agents involved in each site. Greeley and Grand Island were two of the sites for “Operation Wagon Train,” in which 1,297 undocumented immigrants in total were arrested at six Swift & Company meatpacking plants on December 12, 2006.¹⁴ New Bedford was the site of a raid on the military contractor Michael Bianco, Inc., in which 361 undocumented immigrants were arrested on March 6, 2007.¹⁵ These large-scale operations involved substantial logistical support, as hundreds of arrestees were moved across different locations, processed, detained, and then released or deported. They evinced significant community reaction and gained substantial attention in the media. Most of what we learned about the days the raids took place corroborated media reports.

The raids were conducted similarly in all three locations. ICE contacted local law enforcement personnel prior to the raid, but in Greeley and Grand Island no other authorities or community members had advanced warning. In New Bedford, state and local law enforcement officials were contacted in advance of the raid. ICE also contacted the governor, who notified the central office of the Massachusetts DSS. The local DSS office was not informed until the morning of the raid. In all three sites, ICE agents arrived at the plants early in the morning with a large number of vehicles – including several buses – to move arrested immigrants from the plants to processing facilities. To the general community, the movement of many buses and other ICE vehicles into town was the first sign that a raid was in progress.

In Greeley and Grand Island, ICE obtained warrants to search the plants for immigrants charged with identity theft (e.g., use of someone else's Social Security number) and used these warrants to gain access to the manufacturing plants. In New Bedford, ICE had placed an agent in the worksite and, based on the agent's observations, obtained a warrant for employer violations of working conditions and workers' rights. In all three sites, plant management shut down the assembly lines and instructed workers to assemble in central locations, where ICE agents separated them into groups by citizenship and legal status and requested to see their documentation. There were conflicting reports about the degree to which ICE agents were armed and had their guns drawn during the raids. There were also conflicting reports about the number of agents who spoke Spanish and were able to communicate effectively with the arrested workers. Less controversial was the fact that many Guatemalans in all three locations spoke a Mayan dialect, not Spanish, as their first language; ICE certainly had difficulty communicating with this group.

In many cases, the workers were not carrying proper identification documents on their person; therefore, they were initially unable to prove they were citizens or legal residents. As word of the raids spread across the communities, crowds gathered outside the plants. Spouses, relatives, lawyers, advocates, clergy, and others came to the plants to provide documentation for citizens and legal immigrants, although they often had difficulty getting past security – whether ICE, plant security, or local law enforcement – and communicating with ICE workers. In all three plants, it took several hours to sort through the many arrestees and determine their legal status, work authorization, and potential use of other people's Social Security numbers.

There were also conflicting reports of how arrestees were treated during the raids and while still at the plants. Some study respondents said that ICE agents behaved in a “professional manner” during the raids and allowed the workers access to lockers, food,

restrooms, and other necessities. Other respondents claimed that ICE did not allow for breaks or access to food and water for long periods of time. In general, the comments about ICE's conduct of the raids were much more positive in Grand Island than in the other two sites, suggesting there is some variation in enforcement actions depending on the ICE staff involved and the nature of the action. However, in all three sites, arrestees were held for several hours at the plants before boarding buses for other locations where they were to be held for processing, and during this time had no access to legal counsel or communication with their family members about their circumstances. Arrestees were generally placed in handcuffs or had plastic bands tied around their wrists during their transportation from the plants to the processing facilities. In New Bedford some of the arrestees also had their legs shackled during their transportation to detention facilities in Texas.

In all three sites, crowds gathered outside the plants over a period of several hours during which the raids took place. Many were relatives, friends, or others seeking to provide documentation, but others were community leaders and members. In Greeley and Grand Island, several high school students left school when they heard about the raids and went to the plants. There were no incidents of altercations or violence outside the plants at any of the three sites, however.

Much smaller follow-up raids occurred in both Greeley and Grand Island. In Greeley, several immigrants were arrested at a plant subsidiary, and a small number of people were arrested at their homes on the same day as the plant raid. In Grand Island, ICE continued to search for a handful of ID theft suspects by going door to door in the community over the course of several days following the plant raid.

IMPLICATIONS

Large-scale worksite raids involve an extensive show of force on the part of immigration authorities, and older children – especially adolescents – may witness force used against their parents, which can include handcuffing or shackling. The large-scale nature of the raids and the follow-up raids in Greeley and Grand Island kept the immigrant communities living in a state of fear. Pervasive fear and the experience of witnessing force used against their parents could leave a lasting psychological impact on children and adolescents.

DETENTION, RELEASE, AND DEPORTATION OF PARENTS

Arrestees from Greeley and New Bedford were initially processed at ICE facilities within Colorado and Massachusetts, but arrestees from Grand Island were moved to a National Guard camp in Iowa for their initial processing. Initial processing generally involved identifying and recording arrestees' true names and nationalities; collecting fingerprints; checking names and fingerprints against ICE, national criminal, and other databases; and determining whether arrestees should be released, detained, or allowed to leave the country voluntarily.

After initial processing, arrestees were generally sorted into four groups: (1) those taking “voluntary” removal or deportation – who left the country quickly; (2) those detained – either nearby or in many cases in other states – pending resolution of legal status and appeals; (3) those referred to federal or state authorities for trial on criminal charges; and (4) those released on their own recognizance pending an immigration hearing, usually because they were sole or primary caregivers of children (Figure 2).

Voluntary removal or deportation. In Greeley and Grand Island, a large number of arrestees signed papers agreeing to be deported without appeal. In many cases they also agreed to leave the United States before they had any access to a lawyer or an official from their consulate. Greeley had the largest number of Mexican arrestees (128), the majority of whom (86) signed voluntary deportation papers and were flown to the southwestern border within 48 hours.* This group was deported before they had access to lawyers or officials from the Mexican Consulate.** No information on their identities was made available until one and a half weeks after the raid, when the consulate received a list from ICE of all the arrestees. This group was composed almost entirely of men, and many of those with family in Greeley called their family members from the border, after deportation, to get back in touch with them. In addition, most of the 94 Guatemalans who were arrested signed papers agreeing to be deported, and they were deported within 40 days. The Guatemalan Consulate, unlike the Mexican Consulate, was able to provide representation to about half (50 out of 108) of their nationals who were arrested.

In Grand Island, the Mexican-origin population was also large (105 arrestees), and there was also a significant number of voluntary departures (72). Consular officials were able to interview more than 80% of the arrested Mexican-origin population, but many had already signed their deportation papers before these interviews.*** Lawyers seeking to represent the arrestees were denied access during the first seven to ten days (while the arrestees were being held on federal property at the National Guard camp in Iowa), and lawyers had to contact the U.S. Attorney and a U.S. senator for the state to intervene.


* A handful of those deported during the first 48 hours told ICE that they were from Mexico; however, they were actually from Peru or Central America, and were mistakenly deported to Mexico.

** Officials from the Guatemalan Consulate had similar difficulty obtaining access to their nationals within the first two days; however, a much smaller number of Guatemalans were deported right after the raids.

*** Consular officials from Guatemala and other countries did not travel to the ICE processing facility to attempt to gain access to their nationals in detention.

FIGURE 2

Flow of Worksite Arrestees Through ICE Processing, Detention, Release, and Deportation



Source: Adapted by authors of this study from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "Detention and Removal of Illegal Aliens." OIG-06-03. Washington, DC: April 2006.

According to study respondents, some of the arrestees from both Greeley and Grand Island who signed voluntary deportation orders planned to try to return to the United States eventually to be reunited with their families. Voluntary departure is a form of immigration relief allowing undocumented immigrants who are arrested in the United States to agree to leave the country without being forcibly deported. Voluntary departure allows noncitizens an opportunity to remain in the United States for a short period of time to wrap up their affairs, and then to depart without incurring years-long bars on legal reentry and other penalties that are attached to formal deportation orders. In other words, immigrants who take voluntary departure may one day be able to apply for legal admission. By taking voluntary departure, arrested immigrants also avoid lengthy detention, and the earlier they are released and deported, the earlier they can attempt illegal reentry – with its numerous risks and dangers.

In New Bedford, there were not very many voluntary deportations within the first few days because the arrestees there were almost entirely from Guatemala or other Central American countries. Guatemalan consular staff and lawyers from Catholic Charities and Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) were able to see some of the arrestees two days after the raid. Many arrestees, however, were flown to Texas within the first 48 hours before they were given access to lawyers. Consular staff and nine lawyers went to Texas a few days later when they were able to gain access to most of these detainees.* Thirty-five workers from Massachusetts DSS also went to Texas within the first few days to meet with detainees on a separate trip. The vast majority of New Bedford arrestees were detained, some for long periods of time. Only 11 of the arrestees had been deported by the time of the study's site visit, two months after the raid.

Voluntary deportation is a less desirable and more difficult option for undocumented immigrants who are not of Mexican origin. Mexicans are the only group who can be flown to the southwestern border and deported across that border. This involves domestic U.S. air flights, which are much easier for ICE to schedule. Flying Mexican deportees to the border puts them in close proximity to the United States, if they choose to attempt a return border crossing. Arrestees from Guatemala, by contrast, must be flown internationally, and this requires arranging flights with the Guatemalan government, and means that arrestees must spend more time in detention before they can leave the country. It also means that once they return to Guatemala, the deportees will have a more expensive, perilous, and longer journey – at least a few days – to return to the United

* Many of the detainees from New Bedford were sent to a facility in Harlingen, Texas. Harlingen is a small city along the Texas-Mexico border with few immigration attorneys, so legal counsel for this group largely had to be brought in from Massachusetts.

States. Study respondents also said that the economic and social conditions in Guatemala were very problematic for migrants' return, as there was little work, especially in the rural regions of Maya Kiche. We were also told that Guatemala was very dangerous, and many immigrants had already lost relatives due to ongoing crime, violence, and persecution in that country. As a consequence, many Guatemalans did not feel that returning was a viable option, and some preferred being detained to risking a return to Guatemala. Thus, Guatemalans were more likely than Mexican arrestees to fight their deportation cases.

ICE detention. Most of the arrestees who did not sign voluntary deportation orders were detained for significant amounts of time in locations far from their homes and families. In Greeley, the last group of about one dozen detainees was being released at the time of the study's site visit, nearly five months after the raid was conducted. In Grand Island, a handful of arrestees were still in detention nearly six months after the raid. In New Bedford, just two months after the raid, about half of the arrestees (191) were still in detention.

In all three sites, large numbers of detainees were moved out of state after initial processing. In some cases, this was likely due to lack of capacity in nearby ICE facilities, as some ICE detention centers are overcrowded.¹⁶ In other cases, women were moved to separate facilities from men. The movement of detainees to remote facilities made communication with lawyers, family members, and others that much more difficult for detainees. In Greeley, for instance, 46 out of 94 Guatemalans detained were transferred to Houston shortly after the raid. Some of the detainees from Grand Island were moved to Georgia. In New Bedford 90 arrestees were moved to two ICE facilities in Texas within the first couple of days. It was several days before consular officials, lawyers, and Massachusetts DSS workers were able to interview them.

Communication by detainees with their legal representatives and loved ones was also complicated by lack of telephone access in all three sites. In some of the centers, detainees were only allowed to make outside calls using prepaid telephone cards, and these cards were only available for purchase – using funds from detention savings accounts – once per week. In many cases, the only option for detainees was to call their relatives collect at substantial cost. In one site, consular officials were allowed to lend detainees their cell phones to call their families. Otherwise, immigration lawyers and

IMPLICATIONS

Mexican immigrants who are arrested in worksite operations are more likely to choose voluntary departure, allowing them to be released from detention quickly and potentially return to the United States eventually to rejoin their families. Family and community members may not even know they have been arrested before they leave the country. Guatemalan, other Central American, and other non-Mexican immigrants, however, are generally detained for longer periods of time on average because they are more reluctant to sign voluntary departure papers; even if they do, it takes more time for ICE to arrange transportation to their home countries.

IMPLICATIONS

Long-term detention - up to several months - without consistent access to legal representation or working telephones is especially problematic for detainees with families and children. When detainees are moved to remote facilities, it makes it even more difficult for attorneys, social workers, and others to contact them. The isolation of detainees and communication difficulties make it more difficult for parents to arrange care for their children, and more difficult for children to inquire about their parents.

other visitors were generally barred from lending their phones to detainees during their visits. In addition, the phone systems at the detention centers were not always working, as problems with system reliability are widespread in ICE facilities.¹⁷

Release from detention. In all three sites, ICE released some arrestees within a day or two after the raids, based on their roles as primary or sole caregivers for children, or because of family health issues. However, respondents told us that ICE was not always consistent in its policies regarding release of caregivers, and that they had some difficulty in obtaining their release. Moreover, many arrested immigrants did not disclose to ICE that they had children in the United States for fear that their children would be arrested and detained or taken into foster care. One arrestee from Grand Island, for instance, did not tell ICE she had children until she was boarding the plane for her final deportation. Lawyers, consulates, social workers, and other trusted intermediaries were generally more successful in eliciting information about children than were ICE agents.

In Greeley, the vast majority of arrestees with children were living in two-parent families, and the other parent was not arrested. In this site, according to respondents, only a few arrestees were released initially as caregivers. Just seven Mexican arrestees – two men and five women – were released the same day as the raid because they were caregivers. Fourteen Guatemalans were released because they were single parents or actually had work authorization but could not provide it during the raid.

In Grand Island, a similarly low number of arrestees were released soon after the raids to take care of their children. Lawyers were able to obtain the release of nine arrestees – all women; in six cases they were single mothers, and in three cases the husbands were also arrested. The Mexican consulate obtained the release of two women whose children were living without parents. Local community leaders took about half a dozen children with them to an ICE office and were able to obtain the release of their parents.

In New Bedford, 60 detainees were eventually released because they were sole or primary caregivers,¹⁸ and in total 95 were released without bond. Massachusetts DSS workers traveled to Texas to interview detainees being held there and recommended the release of 21 detainees because they were parents. It was only after the interviews, protest by the governor, and the intervention of Massachusetts' two U.S. senators that ICE released 20 of

the detainees. These detainees, who were mostly single parents with young children, spent several days away from their children. In addition, a few minor detainees (under age 18) were released into the custody of Massachusetts DSS and placed in foster care; they were all workers at the plant, and one was also the daughter of another arrested worker.

Most of the detainees identified as sole or primary caregivers were released “on their own recognizance,” in other words without paying a fine or bond. Most of the detainees released over the longer term, however, paid significant bonds to be released. ICE detention sets the minimum bond at \$1,500,¹⁹ but respondents told us of much higher bond amounts, up to \$10,000 in some cases. The bond amounts and difficulty getting released on bond varied greatly from ICE district to district, and as a rule those detainees held out of state had more difficulty getting bond. One immigration judge, for instance, held almost everyone for at least four months, releasing only 16% of those who were eligible on bond.* Another immigration judge set bond amounts at \$4,000 or more. Thus, the setting of bond amounts and bond policies generally were highly dependent on the location of detention and the particular immigration judge presiding over the case. This resulted in unequal treatment of detainees – depending on where they were detained – and unequal consequences for children in terms of prolonged separation from their parents.

Difficulties obtaining legal representation and paying for bonds compounded economic hardship for the families of many arrestees. In Greeley and Grand Island, following the loss of their paychecks, arrestees had to pay attorney fees and bonds from other sources. Respondents told us that some families had sold their automobiles to pay for bonds. Others had taken up collections among relatives or taken out large loans. One family was moving from house to house to try to escape repayment of the loan for their bond. In New Bedford, however, an anonymous donor established a loan fund for portions of bond payments that released detainees which their families could not cover.

In New Bedford, some of the arrestees were released wearing “Electronic Monitoring Devices,” or ankle bracelets. This is the most restrictive form of release and monitoring of arrestees which could potentially add to the stigma associated with arrest and have an additional psychological impact on parents and children.

IMPLICATIONS

Many arrested immigrants do not disclose to ICE that they have children because they fear that their children would be arrested or taken into foster care. They are more likely to disclose this information to trusted intermediaries. When parents do not disclose that they have children, it may delay their release and prolong family separation, with especially severe consequences for young children whose only parent is arrested.

* Only about six of the ICE detainees were ineligible for bond because of criminal charges or other reasons.

IMPLICATIONS

Several factors exacerbate and prolong economic hardship and instability for the families of arrested immigrants, including extended periods of arrest, high bond amounts, and legal fees. Even after they are released, arrested immigrants may need to remain in their communities without work authorization for several months pending adjudication of their cases.

Overall, by the time of our site visits, most arrestees had been released or deported. In Greeley, all of the detainees had been released or deported by the time of our visit, five months after the raid. In Grand Island, a small number – about 25% of those with legal representation – were still in ICE detention six months after the raid. In New Bedford, which we visited just two months after the raid, 149 detainees (42%) had been released, but many (191) were still in detention.

Despite their release from detention, however, the vast majority of all those arrested and still in the country had to wait to find out if and when they would be deported until the final disposition of their cases was determined. Due to backlogs, the waiting period for immigration hearings can run into several months. In Greeley, a handful of arrestees were told they would have to wait up to nine months or a year before their final court date. During this waiting period, even when released, the arrestees do not have legal authorization to work

and have been processed into ICE's list of pending deportations. These immigrants cannot work or make decisions regarding their children until the final determination about their status is made.

Referral for criminal charges. In two of the sites – Greeley and Grand Island – ICE initiated worksite operations to pursue alleged cases of identity theft (e.g., using someone else's Social Security number). In these two sites, a substantial number of arrestees faced criminal charges, and most of these were for either identity theft or for felony reentry into the United States. In Greeley, 21 immigrants (less than 10% of the total) were originally arrested by ICE on criminal charges.²⁰ Six Mexican immigrants were sent to a county jail, but no formal charges were filed, and the group was deported by ICE under administrative charges, i.e., illegal presence in the United States.

In Grand Island, 26 people (about 10% of the total) were arrested on criminal charges, and they were all referred to federal authorities for trial.²¹ The judge gave them a one-year sentence and denied them bond during their detention. This group was held in county jails that have ICE contracts. Some of these detainees are parents, and at least one is a single parent. Despite any caregiving responsibilities, they cannot be released on bond due to the criminal charges.

In New Bedford, ICE did not commence its worksite operation based on suspicion of identity theft or other criminal activity by immigrants working at the plant. As a result, criminal charges were filed against the immigrants arrested there in only a handful of cases.

Relief from deportation. Most of the immigrants arrested in these raids have been or will be deported and, according to study respondents, there were very few forms of relief from deportation available to them. In Greeley and Grand Island, most arrestees had been deported five to six months after the raids, i.e., by the time of the study's site visits. But in New Bedford, all but 11 remained in ICE custody or had been released into the community.

The number of arrestees who received legal counsel and had potential relief from deportation – for example, those who had a chance of staying in the United States legally over the long run – was very small in all three sites. In Greeley, only about 20 of the arrestees were eligible for relief from deportation and received legal assistance. In Grand Island, there were ten cases represented through one of the consulates – most of whom were expected to be successful in obtaining work permits. There were an additional 15 to 17 cases represented by a private lawyer – only two or three of which were expected to succeed. In New Bedford, an order by an immigration judge staying removal applied to 54 arrested immigrants, and another half dozen immigrants had cases that would possibly result in their ability to stay in the United States legally.

Study respondents told us that there are four main forms of relief from deportation available to the arrestees. First, and the most likely to succeed, is marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. Some undocumented immigrants married to citizens or residents are eligible to apply for adjustment of status – e.g., to obtain a green card while in the United States; however, this relief is limited. Immigrants who entered the country illegally are ineligible for adjustment, even if married to citizens or residents, with few exceptions. Second, some of the women who were arrested had viable claims to legal residency based on the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). To make a VAWA claim, they must prove that they were abused, specifically by their spouses. Third, some arrestees could qualify for cancellation of removal, if they could prove ten years or more of U.S. residency and “extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen spouse or child. Extreme hardship typically involves a serious illness or disability of a family member; the woman with the disabled child in the example in the text box on the page might have been able to qualify, were it not for the felony identity theft charge. Finally, some immigrants, particularly those from Guatemala, could file a credible asylum claim. But respondents told us that the success rate for Guatemalan asylum claims is low.

One of the identity theft cases involved a single mother with a disabled child. The disabled child was staying with a brother and sister-in-law who could not provide enough support for the child. Because the mother was arrested for identity theft, she could not be released on bond. As a result, the disabled child was being sent to Guatemala. On lawyers' advice, the arrested mother put in a plea to the immigration judge not to fight her deportation case; if she had fought the deportation, she would have spent at least a year in jail. The judge gave her “time served” as her sentence, and she was sent into ICE custody and deported.

In Greeley and Grand Island, the vast majority of arrestees were deported or would be deported by the time this report was written (summer 2007). Whether or not they signed voluntary deportation papers, were detained for several months, or were released into the community, the arrestees had few avenues of recourse against their eventual removal from the country. A small share of arrestees – about 10% among the two sites – were potentially eligible for some form of relief from deportation, but not all of these cases would succeed. Thus, detention over several months, release into the community, court dates, and appeals were in most cases simply delaying the inevitable decision – whether to leave children in the United States and undergo prolonged family separation or to return children to the deportees' home countries to face the difficult economic and social conditions there.

IMPLICATIONS

For most immigrants arrested in worksite raids, deportation is all but certain, even if departure is delayed by prolonged detention or appeals in immigration courts. There are very few avenues of relief open to undocumented immigrants under such circumstances. Prolonged legal battles delay decisions about children's futures and can be expensive for immigrant families if they do not receive subsidized legal assistance.

In New Bedford the outcome was less clear, in part because the site visit occurred only two months after the raid, as opposed to five to six months in Greeley and Grand Island. A large number of arrested immigrants (54) were subject to an order staying their removal, but study respondents described only a half dozen cases where some form of permanent relief from deportation was available. Four arrestees applied for asylum based on their experiences during the genocide in Guatemala. Two more applied for residency under VAWA; one was a domestic violence case, and the other had been raped by members of the Guatemalan military. There were no cases in New Bedford of marriage to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident.

V. Immediate Impact on Children



While worksite enforcement operations are aimed primarily at deterring employment of undocumented adults, they inevitably and negatively affect numerous children, as shown in the demographic analysis earlier in this report. The impact of these operations on children can best be understood by exploring the range of environmental factors that influence children's well-being. Children develop within the context of the immediate nexus of parents and other family members, as well as the broader community and the various social systems they encounter, including child care settings, schools, community and social networks, and public and private social service programs. How their family, community, and public networks support or fail to support children shapes their course of development.²²

Many aspects of the public and private systems that are supposed to protect children are thrown into chaos during and immediately following worksite operations, creating inevitable disruptions for children. The most important factor for children's safety and well-being is how the raids are conducted, including whether decisions are made that are sensitive to parents' responsibilities and children's needs. The roles of extended family and larger social networks; local leaders; community-based organizations; and public institutions such as schools, social service agencies, and health departments are also important in the immediate aftermath of worksite raids. The roles of each of these institutions in protecting children are the subject of the "Community Responses and Services to Children" section and Appendix 3 of this report.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) PROCEDURES DURING AND FOLLOWING THE RAIDS

The large-scale worksite enforcement actions in the three study sites created crisis scenarios in terms of the care arrangements for the hundreds of children who temporarily lost their parents. In all three locations, the sudden and large-scale nature of the raids – combined with the lack of communication by ICE and lack of community understanding about what was going on – led to a general sense of chaos and fear. On the day of the raids, family members, service providers, and the general public did not know whether or when parents would be released. As knowledge of the raids spread across the communities, concern grew about how to secure care and protection for the children in the short term, including who would pick up children after school and after work hours; provide milk, food, diapers, medicine, and clothes; and feed infants who were accustomed to breastfeeding. This situation deteriorated further toward outright panic as rumors – some of which were accurate and others that were not – spread by word of mouth from family to family during the first 24 to 36 hours after the raids. In addition, ICE continued to conduct small-scale raids in other workplaces and homes in both Greeley and Grand Island – further heightening fears and tensions.

As a result of the widespread fear and chaos, many families went into hiding during the first few days, or in some cases weeks, following the raids. In all three sites, there were stories of families who hid in their basements or closets for days at a time. People would leave the house only in small groups on short, focused trips, for instance to buy food. They kept their shades drawn and houses darkened. Some would not even open the door for people who came to bring them food or other forms of assistance. This seclusion was especially common, and lasted for several weeks, in Grand Island, where ICE continued to conduct door-to-door enforcement operations for several days after the worksite operation.

Many families and nonrelatives scrambled to locate children and arrange care for them on the day of the raid because arrested parents were not given access to telephones or other methods to communicate with their families. As a result, the responsibility for children's care depended mainly on where they were located – at school, at home, at a babysitter's house, or at a child care center.

In Greeley and Grand Island, the vast majority of children lived in two-parent families, and only one parent – more often the father – was arrested.* In New Bedford, about half

* Nationally, three-quarters of undocumented immigrant families with children have two parents in the home.

of the parents who were arrested were released at various points because they were the primary caregivers for very young children. In some cases, responsibility for children was transferred to nonrelative providers – the children's usual babysitters or others – when no adults in the family remained to provide supervision.

Many parents did not disclose that they had children or provide correct information about their children's care arrangements. They feared that ICE agents would detain their children or other relatives, or that child welfare workers would take their children into custody. These fears were especially acute in Grand Island, where there were rumors that ICE agents had gone to schools and some children had been taken into custody during a previous worksite operation years earlier.

In addition, immigrants in Grand Island were fearful of losing their children to foster care based on a high-profile case in which an undocumented Guatemalan mother had been separated from one of her children for many months following a child abuse report. Nebraska Department of Human Services (DHS) had removed the child from the home and reported the mother to immigration authorities. She was deported before her court date in the child welfare system and lost custody of the child. After she left the country, she had to fight to get her child back from foster care.

After the immigration raids, ICE released many parents late in the evening, at night, or during the days that followed. In some cases, young children spent at least one night without a parent, often in the care of another relative or babysitter, before the arrested parent was released.

In Grand Island, several parents were released late on the day of the raid, but only after community leaders took their children along with some of their family members to the local ICE office. Community leaders claimed that their presence along with the children at the office helped convince ICE to release the parents.

In New Bedford, an older mother with a toddler was not released until late in the evening because, she said, it took some time to convince ICE that she was a parent. She called her cousin, who was living with her and the child at the time, to get diapers and milk for the little girl. Twenty other parents who had been arrested in New Bedford were flown to Texas, and it took several days before Massachusetts DSS workers could get there and

"My cousin's husband was deported. The little boy must be only two or three years old. [The parents] were both arrested. She was in jail for six to eight days. They took her to Port Isabel [Texas]. The son was with the babysitter during this time. She said that she had a young son but they [ICE] did not believe her. I don't approach the topic of how her son held up while she was in jail. We've never talked about it."

IMPLICATIONS

The combination of fear, lack of telephone access, and the late release of many primary caregivers makes it difficult to arrange care for children when both parents are or a single parent is arrested. There is a high probability that arrested parents will not disclose correct information about children due to mistrust of ICE and child welfare authorities. Remaining family members are likely to go into hiding, making it even more difficult to find out information about the children of arrestees.

make arrangements with ICE to interview them. These parents were eventually released, but only after a week or more in detention and the intervention of the governor and two U.S. senators.

In Greeley, a mother with an infant was detained by ICE for 17 days. Her husband had been arrested on charges unrelated to the raid and was held until three days after the raid. During these three days the infant stayed with a babysitter, and the father took over caregiving responsibilities after the third day. The baby did not, however, have access to the mother's breast milk for about two weeks. The mother told us that ICE did not ask her whether or not she had children or where her child was until midnight on the day of the raid. When she responded that she had an infant, ICE still declined to release her.

FAMILIES AND EXTENDED NETWORKS

For the most part, immigrant communities in the three sites were able to avoid the most dangerous circumstances of young children left abandoned, homeless, or without someone to watch over them. In all three sites, no children became homeless, and in Greeley and Grand Island no children were taken into state custody. In New Bedford, ICE

referred a few adolescents to state custody; these were minors who were working at the raided plant.* In all three sites, schools put into place emergency shelters, and teachers offered to take children home with them. Families in the broader communities also offered to adopt children temporarily. However, these offers proved unnecessary, as extended networks of family members, friends, or others in the immigrant communities took on significant caregiving responsibilities.

Heavy reliance on extended family networks was an effective response to the emergency needs of children in the context of the raids. This strong family orientation, termed *familismo* by anthropologists, social workers, and public health practitioners, is characteristic among small immigrant communities and Latinos.²³ The basic dimensions of *familismo* include family-level decision-making, the perception that family members are reliable providers of help and problem-solvers, and the provision of material and emotional support to needy family members.²⁴ In the context of the arrest of family

* One of them was the daughter of another worker who was arrested.

members by immigration authorities, *familismo* was an effective response to the emergency needs of children. Without this informal response, parents and community respondents said, a broader crisis would have been inevitable, especially in cases where primary caregivers were held for extended periods of time. Strong extended family networks are characteristic of many immigrant groups besides Latinos, and so it is likely that these networks would be able to take on similar functions when non-Latino immigrant communities are affected by immigration enforcement operations.

In spite of the responsiveness of the immigrant community, many children faced traumatic circumstances and insecure care throughout the day and in the period after the raids. In New Bedford, respondents mentioned that at least one landlord showed up at an emergency assistance site on the evening of the raid with young children who belonged to tenants who were detained in the raid. In Grand Island, local community leaders took several children to a local ICE office to demand release of their parents. In Greeley and Grand Island, respondents knew of adolescents who spent considerable time without adult supervision. In one case a youth spent several days alone because both parents were arrested in the raid. In one household, three adolescents were left to fend for themselves after both parents were detained; neighbors provided occasional supervision. The respondents only found out about those cases because the youth subsequently showed up at food banks to ask for assistance. Another adolescent spent months in the care of a pastor of a local church where his parents worshipped. And in one case an adolescent girl with an infant, who was living with her younger sister, visited a nonprofit social service provider for assistance. The girl, her baby, and her sister were living together without an adult in the home.

Several young children were also left behind in the care of their relative and nonrelative babysitters, many of whom struggled to stretch their own limited economic resources to meet their new responsibilities. In the most critical case mentioned by respondents in New Bedford, a seven-month-old baby who was being breastfed was left in the care of a relative babysitter. The infant was unaccustomed to any other feeding method and refused cow's milk, then had to be rushed to the hospital due to dehydration on the night of the raid. The mother was detained for a few days before finally being released to continue to care for her son. A few days after the raid in another site, a babysitter called a church hotline set up for affected families hoping to find some way to communicate to a

In one study site, a nonrelative babysitter stayed with a 14-month-old baby for four months. The baby's father was a single parent who had been arrested but not released quickly after the raid. The babysitter was unable to benefit from financial assistance offered to families affected by the raid since she did not have the child's birth certificate and lacked proof of her relationship to the child. She was a grandmother and was also responsible for caring for several grandchildren. The babysitter picked up food and essential supplies at an emergency assistance site for four months until the child's father returned.

IMPLICATIONS

Extended family and community networks provide the most important safety net for caregiving and emergency needs of children, making it unlikely that large numbers of children would be left unsupervised following a raid. However, the economic resources of these families and communities are often strained to meet children's needs, and there is no guarantee that they can meet all the needs of the affected children.

detained father that she would take good care of the four-month-old baby left in her care; she knew the mother had already been deported. The babysitter also said that she had a dire need for food, milk, diapers, and clothes, which were subsequently delivered to her by the hotline operator.

PUBLIC SCHOOL CHILDREN

Public schools served an important role in protecting the children of arrested immigrants on the day of the raids in two of the study sites. In Greeley and Grand Island, the majority of children were in school on the day of the raids, so school systems' responses affected a large number of children. School administrators and teachers in these two school districts said that they felt a heavy burden when dealing with instructional goals and normal daily routines while also managing a broad range of unanticipated issues that arose following the raids.

In New Bedford, however, 71% of the children were ages five and under and, therefore, most were not in school. In the case of these younger children, respondents said that most were in informal care settings, often with relatives or other Central American neighbors.²⁵ Many New Bedford families were either not informed about or averse to more formal child care settings because they believed that their citizen children were not eligible due to parental undocumented status, or they were fearful of any formal contact with public agencies.

The schools in Grand Island had developed a central plan for dealing with a workplace raid, following their experience with another large raid in 1992. The schools there had a database which included information about the parents' employers, and so the school was able to contact all children whose parents were working at the raid site. Teachers and other staff conducted one-on-one sessions with children of arrestees to ensure that each child knew what to do and whom to call if they found themselves alone without a caregiver. Bus drivers were instructed not to drop children off at homes where their parents or other trusted adults were not present. School officials hoped to prevent children from learning about the details of the raids and the potential loss of a parent or loved one while they were still at school. In Greeley, without prior experience of a raid or knowledge of which children might be affected, school administrators and staff improvised and developed many of the same strategies as those in Grand Island.

The impact of the raids played out very differently across as well as within the school systems in the three study sites. In Greeley, between a third and half of the student body

were picked up early in the schools with the highest proportions of Latino students. The other two school systems had a small number of schools that experienced only a few early pick-ups on the day of the raids. In some of these schools, some of the adults picking up the children had not been previously authorized to do so, and these cases were resolved with some improvisation by principals and teachers.* The schools either allowed students to identify their relationships with the individuals attempting to pick them up, or called other persons listed as authorized or emergency contacts to verify the identities of these individuals. In some cases authorized persons called to notify the schools that someone new would be coming that day to pick up the children.

The school systems in all three sites also scrambled to put in place emergency measures to ensure that children had adult supervision by the end of the day. In all three sites, the school administrators directed bus drivers to ensure that every child was dropped off with a caretaker. One or a few schools were designated emergency “shelters” so that students could return if no one was home. Those students who typically were picked up after school stayed with teachers or staff until someone (a parent, relative, or friend) retrieved them. In Grand Island it was late in the evening, 8:30 p.m., by the time the last middle school student was picked up by her mother who had been detained and just released that evening. In Grand Island, teachers offered to take children home with them overnight, but all of the children were picked up by the end of the day.

In all three sites, school officials and community respondents reported that they were able to avoid having any child left stranded at school or dropped off by a bus to an empty home. On the other hand, in Greeley and Grand Island, some elementary and middle school children who usually walked home spent a few hours alone, or with a cousin or sibling, on the day of the raids. According to parents and other caregivers we interviewed, these children did not know where their parents were. Some of the children were visited by neighbors or friends, or went to their houses to find out what was going on and ask for assistance.

While it was easier to prevent elementary and middle school students from learning about the raids, high school students had more access to communication with the outside community. Students with mobile phones and radios quickly learned about the raids. This contributed to unruly classrooms and an emotionally charged day. Some students left early

* Public school systems are allowed to release students only to persons listed in forms pre-submitted by a primary caretaker or with some other form of approval by a primary caretaker.

IMPLICATIONS

School systems have a responsibility to ensure the safety of all children in their care, and they play a major role in child protection following a raid, at least in places where the majority of arrestees' children are of school age. Proactive responses by schools help ensure that children are not left without adult supervision, and can also lead to better attendance and fewer disruptions for children. Head Start, Early Head Start, state-sponsored pre-kindergarten, and other formal child care settings could be important resources for families affected by raids by offering safe havens, helping to meet children's nutritional needs, and providing connections to social supports. The very low enrollment of immigrants' children, however, severely limits the reach of formal child care settings in helping families respond to immigration raids.

on their own to rush to the raid sites, meet up with relatives, pick up siblings from school, or babysit younger siblings at home. In Greeley, a group of youth protested outside the plant on the day of the raid.

As part of the overall climate of fear on the day of the raids, rumors began to spread that immigration agents might show up at schools to arrest undocumented children and parents. In all three sites, teachers and principals received calls from distraught parents throughout the day to check on the status of their children. Some parents and other relatives stopped by during the day to see their children to make sure they had not been picked up by ICE. Community leaders traveled between the schools and the raided worksites in the hopes of informing the family members of arrestees outside the plant that their children were safe and not at risk of being detained. The administration of the Grand Island schools made repeated public statements that the schools were safe and that ICE would not be allowed on the premises. These public assurances helped assuage immigrants' fears about keeping their children in school, and helped Grand Island's school attendance rebound within a few days after the raid.

VI. Longer-Term Impact on Children



Children of undocumented parents already faced a challenging journey even before the immigration raids. Many children of undocumented immigrants were already at risk for a number of disadvantages, including low income or poverty, low parental education, and limited English proficiency. Overall, among children of immigrants, poverty rates are significantly higher, as are other rates of economic hardship, for instance food insecurity, crowded housing, and high housing cost burdens for families.²⁶ Studies have established links between family income and children's health, cognitive development, and educational achievement.²⁷ They have shown that lower income puts immigrants' children at risk of poorer health and developmental delays.²⁸

On the other hand, studies of immigrants' children have also shown that their families have important strengths, including a higher prevalence of two-parent families, extended families, and more working adults in the household.²⁹ The relative strength of immigrant families protects children from the adverse consequences often associated with growing up with single parents.

Worksite enforcement operations, by removing both a parent and a breadwinner from the home, have multiple consequences for children. First, the removal of a breadwinner substantially lowers family income and thereby further increases families' material hardship. Second, the loss of a parent creates a more unstable home environment and removes one of the main strengths in immigrant families – the presence of two parents.

In addition, the fear and stigma associated with a raid can isolate immigrant families and have a direct psychological impact on children. All of these factors, individually or combined, have a profound impact on child development and well-being.

FAMILY FRAGMENTATION

The most destabilizing impact on the children of arrestees following worksite enforcement actions came from the separation and fragmentation of families. In most cases, children were living with both parents and only one parent was arrested. But there were also cases in which both parents were arrested. In Grand Island, according to school district data, 25 of the 151 affected children (or about 17%), experienced the arrest of both parents.* In addition, there were cases of single parents being arrested. In New Bedford, for instance, approximately half of arrested parents were released at various points in time because they were single parents or primary caregivers of young children.

Family structure prior to the raid significantly affected the extent of family fragility following the raid. In all cases except those in which parents were released on the day of the raid, children lost at least one parent for an extended period of time. In the case of two-parent families, ICE seldom released the second parent on the day of the raid, and so two-parent families temporarily became one-parent families. As a result of communication difficulties in detention centers and lack of attorney and consular access, many families did not know the location of the arrested parent for several days. This was especially true in Greeley, where almost 100 arrestees were deported before any contact with attorneys or consulates; the first word from these deportees came via phone calls after their deportation. But in all three sites, a significant number of parents were detained for weeks and even months without regular and consistent contact with their family members.

During this time period the remaining parent often had significant difficulty coping with the economic and psychological stress caused by the arrest of their spouse or partner. Study respondents said that the remaining parent – usually the mother – was often less integrated into U.S. society and less familiar with the means to cope with daily life than the spouse or partner. This was especially true among Guatemalan families. For instance, in Grand Island, study respondents said that many of the Guatemalan women

* Data were not obtained on the share of children with both parents arrested in Greeley.

did not have driver's licenses and did not know how to drive. They were unaccustomed to making basic financial decisions and did not have access to husbands' bank accounts. Some women rarely left the house, even before the raids. For these women, the loss of their husbands represented not only the loss of a partner and breadwinner, but also a loss of direction and increased isolation. Following the raid, some of these Guatemalan mothers were left isolated, afraid, and unable to make the basic decisions about daily life that their husbands had often made before the raid.

By the time of the study interviews in Greeley and Grand Island – some five to six months after the raids – almost all of the arrestees had been deported or released from detention. In some of these cases, the second parent had been released and reunited with the family temporarily. In cases where the parent was deported, some families hoped that the deported parent might be able to return illegally or were in the process of moving to rejoin the parent abroad. In New Bedford, a majority of arrestees remained in detention at the time of the study visit, about two months after the raid. Thus, family separation caused by detention and deportation generally lasted for a period of months for most two-parent families.

Family fragility was more acute but the period of separation was much shorter in families where a single parent or both parents were arrested. In these cases, during the period of parents' detention, extended family members and others in the community took in their children. Respondents described the responsibility of the immigrant community to “take care of our own” children. In all three sites, community leaders and other respondents said that preventing any children from being taken into the custody of the state was one of their major accomplishments following the raids. However, as described earlier, the arrangements for these children were in some cases ad hoc and unreliable. In Greeley and Grand Island, there was a handful of cases in which very young children were moved from home to home over a period of weeks because temporary caregivers were unable to meet their needs. There were also cases in which babysitters stayed with children for extended periods of time – up to four months in one case in Grand Island.

For the most part, however, family separation lasted only a few days or at most a few weeks in single-parent families. In New Bedford, 60

IMPLICATIONS

Single-parent families are the most vulnerable following immigration enforcement operations that result in arrests. Often, these families are already fragile, and the loss of the single parent can lead to immediate hardship for the child and chaotic living arrangements for a period of time, even when extended family and community members provide support and care. If parents are released quickly, however, the impact on children can be mitigated. On the other hand, family separation and fragility last longer in two-parent families following arrests because the second parent is less likely to be released quickly. If the remaining parent – usually the mother – is unaccustomed to making major decisions regarding finances and other issues, the family may become immobilized and isolated following the raids.

primary caregivers (some of whom were single parents) of young children – a majority of the parents arrested – were released without bail and within a period of a few days. In Grand Island only about a dozen parents were released as single caregivers, and in Greeley this number was under ten. However, the share of arrestees who were single parents was very low in both of these sites.

FAMILY ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND INSTABILITY

The families who lost breadwinners as a result of the raids faced enormous economic challenges. Most of these families already had few resources and were living “paycheck to paycheck” before the raids. Exceptions were the more established families in Grand Island and Greeley, some of whom had worked in the plants for several years. In some cases these families had established credit histories and owned homes and automobiles. But most immigrant families in the three study sites rented their homes and had few assets or savings.

Impact on extended families and multifamily households. Economic hardship and instability extended beyond the families whose members were arrested in the raids. Following the raids, the plants in Greeley and Grand Island conducted reviews of the documentation of their employees to weed out other undocumented workers. The raids in both plants took place during daytime shifts, and workers in evening shifts were not arrested. In the weeks following the raids, as the plants conducted their documentation reviews, some undocumented workers were fired and others quit their jobs. Even though fewer undocumented workers subsequently left their jobs than were arrested in the raids, they added to the growing pool of families who lost breadwinners.

“My 17-year-old son skipped school because his 17-year-old friend was at home watching his younger brother and sister; his parents had been arrested. He was scared to leave his house to go over to his aunt’s house. So my son called me, and I went and took him and his younger brother and sister to his aunt’s house. There were four adults and 12 children living in this house.”

Extended family members and others who took in the children of arrested parents also experienced increased economic hardship. In some cases, affected children were already living in extended multifamily households, and these households lost one or more earners. In other cases, families who lost a breadwinner moved in with other families so that they could pool resources. As previously mentioned, a babysitter who took care of a child for four months also had several grandchildren of her own to support. These multifamily households often became increasingly crowded and their resources became strained following the raids. The *familismo* of these extended households – in other words, their strong reliance on mutual support and decision-making – meant that hardship was spread among larger units of adults and children.

In Grand Island, study respondents told us that most of the affected Mexican families were able to make contact with relatives or friends who were documented or citizens. By moving in with citizens or legal immigrants, they were able to ensure that at least some household members would retain their jobs. But in the Guatemalan community, there were very few citizens or legal immigrants. As a result, most of the affected families were unable to find households where the other adults were safe from losing their jobs or being swept up in ongoing household raids.

Reliance on savings, last paychecks, and assets. Families who lost breadwinners as a result of the raids and subsequent job losses relied on a combination of savings and last paychecks; support from extended family and community members; increased work among remaining members; and financial and other assistance, mostly from private community sources. Savings dwindled quickly because most families had only about one or two weeks' cash on hand. In Greeley and Grand Island, workers were paid weekly, and paychecks were generally spent by the end of the week. In both of these sites, workers were arrested early in the week, so they did not get their last paycheck. Swift & Company, with help from consulates and the union, was able to get last paychecks to many families within the first couple of weeks. But within the first month, these sources of income had virtually dried up.

A number of families in Greeley and Grand Island owned their own homes and automobiles and were able to sell their assets or obtain loans based on their credit history to help cover short-term costs. Some families in these sites also had savings accounts, although in some cases the parent who was not arrested did not have access to the accounts. However, the majority of families in Greeley and Grand Island, along with virtually all affected families in New Bedford, did not have sufficient resources to help them through the initial period of economic instability following the raids.

Supplemental employment in affected families. Some of the parents who were arrested and released were able to find work. Generally, the jobs they found were informal because the arrested parents were all

One family in Grand Island moved away to a small town in another part of Nebraska following the raid. The wife had permanent residency and had been in the United States since she was less than two years old. Her husband was undocumented. She worked days at the plant and was at work when the raid occurred; he worked on the night shift. She had not yet applied to renew her green card, which had expired. Even so, she was not arrested. However, one week later she lost her job when the company checked her paperwork and discovered that her green card was expired. They moved out of town, and the husband worked for a rancher who was verbally and physically abusive. He left that job, and they both started working at another ranch. They had a 12-year-old daughter with bad asthma; she had been seeing a specialist in Grand Island who accepted their insurance. They lost their insurance with their jobs and lost access to the specialist when they moved. The child's asthma worsened dramatically, and the family had no choice but to turn to a migrant health clinic for assistance.*

* In this case, it may have been technically illegal for the company to terminate her because of an expired green card; she most likely did have legal authorization to work since work authorization and legal permanent residency do not expire simply because a green card expires. However, she may have decided not to protest her termination or pursue a legal claim against the company because she needed to move on account of her undocumented husband.

undocumented and had to be very careful about seeking further illegal employment. Most of the spouses and partners of arrestees were also undocumented, but some were already working and extended their work hours. Some parents in Greeley and Grand Island were able to find agricultural work. Some of the women in all three sites began taking care of children at home for pay, and others started cooking meals for people or selling items informally. All of these types of jobs paid substantially less than the manufacturing jobs in Greeley and Grand Island, which were among the best-paying jobs available to immigrants in those communities. In addition, it was often difficult for released arrestees or their spouses to find full-time work.

Some families moved out of town altogether to avoid future scrutiny from ICE and to find secure employment. But these families often faced much greater economic insecurity than they had before the raid, and their children sometimes suffered as a consequence.

Dependence on assistance from private sources. Each of the 30 parents and other caregivers interviewed for the study became heavily dependent on various forms of assistance offered by community groups and religious institutions following the raids. They all received financial assistance to help cover rent and other housing expenses for a period of one to three months. The majority were helped with utility bills. All of the families interviewed had visited a food bank or other food distribution site to pick up groceries and diapers, or used charity grocery cards to purchase basic necessities such as soap and shampoo and perishable items such as milk for their children. But very few families relied on public assistance, since the undocumented family members were generally not eligible for such assistance and families were fearful of seeking relief from public agencies. The lack of public assistance is described in more detail in the section of the report on “Community Responses and Services to Children.”

Pooling of resources through families and extended networks. The parents and other caretakers interviewed relied heavily on extended family and community networks for financial and other assistance over the longer term, as they did immediately following the raids. The material form of *familismo* was a central element in long-term responses to the raids, as three-quarters of the caregivers interviewed said that they had received cash assistance or substantial loans from friends or family members. Extended families and multifamily households also pooled resources to manage living costs. In these cases, workers who had not been arrested (but typically were undocumented) became fully responsible for household maintenance. For example, a single parent who was arrested lived with two young daughters in a small two-bedroom apartment and shared this apartment with a single cousin who had recently arrived from Guatemala. Following the mother's arrest, a second single cousin who was renting an apartment with a friend joined

the household to help support the girls. The two single men, both undocumented workers, were paying the \$600 rent and other bills at the time of our interview.

Another example involves a household of three adults and three children, in which two of the adults lost their jobs in one of the worksite raids. The household was composed of a single mother, her high-school-age daughter, and her older son along with his wife and two daughters. The mother and her daughter-in-law were both arrested and then released; they lost their jobs. For three months following the raid, the six-person household relied on the son's income of about \$400 per month plus rent, utility, and food assistance offered by churches and relief agencies.

Housing cost burdens and food insecurity. The combination of privately offered assistance by community groups and extended family networks prevented the families included in our study from facing the worst hardships such as homelessness. But these sources of support dwindled over time, and by the time of the study visits – a few months after the raids – families were facing increasing economic insecurity and material hardship. One of the study respondents, a single father with two children, said, “The people in our community opened their hearts and helped us so much. Now, though, I just live day to day, because looking ahead I just don’t see how I will be able to make it.”

A number of the caregivers interviewed had their utilities or phone service cut off, though generally for just a short period of time. In one of the sites, two of the ten respondents were several weeks late with their rent payments; others had been late with past payments. Some families moved due to inability to pay housing costs. One family interviewed for the study had moved twice in the six months since the raid, and their daughter had changed schools both times. Three families had moved to a smaller apartment or house where they paid less in rent.

Three-quarters of the parents and other caretakers interviewed said that their families faced some degree of food insecurity after the raids. They told us that they generally ate less than before the raids and sometimes skipped meals to leave more food for the children. Some respondents said that the children also ate less, and they attributed this

IMPLICATIONS

Many families lose breadwinners when parents are arrested, and even more families may lose breadwinners if parents leave jobs or are terminated following raids. Families often have limited resources such as savings, last paychecks, and cash on hand that can help them survive during the first few weeks following a parent's arrest or job loss. Extended families, informal networks, and community social service providers are also able to help affected families with basic forms of assistance – food, shelter, and other necessities – for a short period of time. These resources are often inadequate, however, to meet the longer-term needs of affected families, and after a few months many families begin to experience significant economic insecurity and hardship.

to stress as well as difficulties adjusting to the kinds of foods the parents could afford to feed them after the raid. For example, many children were not accustomed to the canned foods given out at the food banks. In Greeley, some of the community respondents said that the food banks were not stocked with foods that Latinos were accustomed to eating. Therefore, some families preferred food donations from the Latino community because they more closely matched their diet. Customary treats for children, such as going out for pizza or fast food, were no longer feasible after the raids. In the words of one mother with two children whose husband was arrested, “The kids are kids. They keep asking for things we can’t provide now. They just don’t know why we can’t buy them the stuff that they like and are used to, so they just eat less now.”

INTERRUPTIONS TO SCHOOLING

Although the study was not in the field long enough to observe behaviors in school, respondents did provide some evidence suggesting that many children missed days of school, and that stress related to the raids may have sapped the attention of some children and affected their academic performance. The most obvious impact on children’s schooling was the increase in absences reported in all three study sites. Declines in attendance following the raids were uneven across the sites, but in all three the schools with the highest proportion of Latino students saw the largest declines in attendance. In Greeley, school officials estimated that attendance declined by one-third to one-half on the week of the raid at two schools located in areas with high immigrant populations, and somewhat less at other nearby schools. Many families went into hiding out of fear of ongoing household raids and kept their children out of school for the first few days. In Grand Island, school district respondents reported that absences increased by ten or more children at some schools, and by about 20 at one school, on the days after the raid. Attendance steadily increased following the raids, and within two to three weeks had returned to normal in all three sites.

Parents, teachers, counselors, and school officials all recounted that some of the children were shaken up for days or weeks after the raid, making it difficult to hold their attention and for them to stay on track with academic plans and goals. The scene on the morning after was described as very emotional, especially at the elementary schools. Children saw the fear on the faces of their parents and relatives; some even witnessed the arrest of parents in their homes. One child told a teacher, “My daddy was arrested for working.” A first-grade teacher relayed that, “The next day a lot of the kids were very emotionally upset, crying, and shaking. They were telling each other stories that they were told or overheard – about parents’ hands tied; they took their phones; they couldn’t come home; they just left.” A second-grade teacher emotionally told the story of a little girl, a “dream

student,” who always came to school well-coiffed and impeccably dressed, but showed up the morning after the raid disheveled and fatigued.

The emotional distress was most evident among children whose parents were arrested, but fear spread to many other children following the raids, as they learned details from conversations at home and with other students. The students empathized with each other, and “all of them were upset because they felt bad for the kids whose relatives that had happened to.” They also built up fears that it would happen to them. There was pervasive insecurity about whose parents would be “taken” next. One teacher said, “I think the hardest [for them] is their not knowing [what is going to happen] at the beginning. The little girl [six years old] was afraid they would come get her mother and father. A lot of the others said the same.” Children tended to get most emotional at “story time,” when teachers led open-ended conversations with the children together. One teacher said that raid-related comments were “constantly surfacing” during story time.

The absences and distractions posed challenges for teachers’ lesson plans and students’ academic performance. A second-grade teacher said, “That next day you couldn’t really teach them. You tried to but ended up doing something else because their minds were not there. They were pretty distraught all day, agitated, very concerned. Some of them had been up until very late [the previous night].” Two of the elementary school teachers said that they had children who turned in homework late in the weeks after the raid, but both teachers allowed the students to catch up or make up the work.

The raids also appeared to have had some impact on the attention and academic performance of some of the older children. A pastor who counseled many adolescent children of undocumented parents said that raid concerns drained much of their attention. “Because of confusion and the problems of their parents or their own status,” he warned, “we are losing the energy these kids [have to offer] society. They are bright, intelligent, creative young kids who have a lot to offer. But immigration just dominates their thoughts. Their energy is just going elsewhere.”* One 17-year-old senior high school honors student missed two weeks of school while her mother was detained

IMPLICATIONS

In the short term, worksite raids may distract children’s attention from their schoolwork and lead to severe disruptions in attendance, homework, and behavior. In the longer term, however, the implications for children’s academic performance are unclear.

* Nationally in 2005, 85% of children of undocumented immigrants under six years old were U.S.-born citizens. But among children over age ten, i.e., those in middle and high school, more than half (56%) were undocumented.

and ended up missing several assignments and grades. Only some of her teachers allowed her to make up the work. Another high school student had good attendance and grades prior to the raid, but afterward his academic performance deteriorated. This student was eventually arrested for shoplifting groceries in an apparent attempt to help his mother feed the family.

Respondents in the schools told us that the majority of children recovered academically a few months after the raid. However, due to the study's short time frame (just two to six months following the raids), the longer-term impact on children's behavior and schooling could not be assessed.

EMOTIONAL TRAUMA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH ISSUES

Although children can be resilient under difficult and unstable circumstances, the severe disruptions caused by the raids in the three study sites led to behavioral problems and psychological distress for some children. Separation from arrested parents caused emotional trauma in some children, especially because it happened suddenly and unexpectedly. The trauma of separation was greater when it continued for an extended period of time. Community-wide fear and social isolation accentuated the psychological impact on children. Yet, few parents sought or received mental health care for themselves or their children.

Psychological impact of separation. Perhaps the greatest impact on children was the emotional trauma that followed separation from one or both parents. One of the major challenges for the parents who were not arrested was how to explain to their children the separation of a missing parent and manage their emotions. For children, especially very young children, the sudden loss of a parent played out like a “disappearance” and threatened their sense of security. The parents left behind struggled over whether and how to explain the disappearance, as well as how much hope to offer for a resolution. Most of the older children were either told what happened by the remaining parent or heard about it from other sources. In a number of cases, though, parents told their children other stories, which often seemed unsatisfactory to the children. Some parents or caregivers said that the missing parent had to stay away at work for a long period of time; others said that the missing parent was visiting family in their country of origin.

Even if the parent returned within a day or soon thereafter, the period of separation remained current in the child's memory and created ongoing anxiety in many cases. Psychologists interviewed for the study associated this pervasive sense of insecurity and the anxiety it produced in children with conditions ranging from separation anxiety to attachment disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Children – as well as some parents – felt “the ongoing stress that any day things can change, [that there is a] constant chance of separation.” One mother interviewed for the study said, “One morning we were a tight family, and the next day it is all trauma and tension.” Some parents said that, months after the raids, their children still cried in the morning when getting dropped off at school or day care, something that they rarely used to do. Children were said to obsess over whether their parents were going to pick them up from school or if – like on the day of the raid – someone else would show up. Even children whose parents were not arrested developed many of these same fears.

Some children said things to parents, other caregivers, or teachers which revealed how they had begun to personalize the cause of the separation. Especially among very young children, who could not understand the concept of parents not having “papers,” sudden separation was considered personal abandonment. In some cases, separation triggered sadness; in others, it led to anger toward the parent who left or the one who remained. One child retorted, “So *papi* doesn't want to spend time with us?” A mother relayed that her eight-year-old was more volatile and said, “[He acts] now like he hates us.” She added, “And he's aggressive; he hits other kids and hardly listens to me.” Another chided the parent for “loving money more than he loves me.” One child complained that the parent might be in the home country and asked, “Didn't we come here to be together? Why does he have to leave now?” Psychologists were concerned that these kinds of statements could indicate the onset of depression and other mental health challenges for children.

Fear and social isolation. Immigrant communities in all three sites experienced widespread fear following the raids, and this more general fear increased psychological duress for children. Two key threats propelled ongoing community fear. First, in two of the communities, immigration agents continued to pursue suspected undocumented immigrants with follow-up operations in private homes and other locations. In Grand Island, these operations continued for longer than a week, extending the environment of chaos and fear. Second, all three study sites experienced some degree of polarization between Latino immigrants and other community residents. According to study respondents, community tensions appeared highest in Greeley – where some anti-

immigrant activists had been protesting in favor of establishing an ICE office prior to the raid, and there had been counter protests in the Latino community. Also in Greeley, some teachers and students derided children whose parents were arrested. But there were also community tensions in the other two sites. For instance in Grand Island, one of the respondents – who is a naturalized citizen – was fearful after the raids of going to stores where non-Hispanics shopped because she felt she would be stereotyped as an undocumented immigrant.

Ongoing fears about ICE operations and community tensions led to widespread social isolation among immigrant families, which manifested itself most clearly in family seclusion.

In the most extreme cases, families and children hid in their homes for days or weeks at a time – sometimes staying in the basement or with their lights turned down so that no one would know they were home. Many families would not open the door for strangers or even acquaintances who brought them food and other forms of assistance, especially in Grand Island where these fears were most acute. Some families stayed at other safe havens such as in friends' basements or in local churches. In the words of one community leader we interviewed, “Families folded into themselves. People stopped going out in the street. People are living even more in the shadows.”

Psychologists and other mental health professionals interviewed for the study suggested that social exclusion and isolation following the raids might induce depression and accentuate psychological distress among some parents and children. Many children absorbed the feeling of being outcasts from the broader community, even from their own previous social networks. Some children were warned not to identify who their parents were to anyone. Children's social networks in some cases exacerbated social exclusion, for instance, when they were harassed by other children or branded as criminals because their parents were arrested.

Changes in children's behavior. Parents, teachers, other caregivers, and mental health professionals who work with children reported changes in behavior which raised concerns about the children's vulnerability to emotional and psychological problems following the raids. Many children exhibited outward signs of stress. For instance, some lost their appetites, ate less, and lost weight. Others became more aggressive or increasingly displayed “acting out” behaviors. Some children also had more trouble than usual falling asleep or sleeping through the night. While impossible to evaluate in the

context of this study, mental health professionals suggested that many of these symptoms can lead to or are consistent with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or separation anxiety. One ten-year-old boy whose mother was briefly detained was diagnosed with major depression.

For one eight-year-old boy, stress associated with his mother's arrest manifested in health problems. Although his mother was released on the evening of the raid, he was unexpectedly picked up from school by a friend. While in the friend's care, the boy overheard a conversation about the raid and cried for a couple of hours until his mother arrived home. Following his mother's return, he found out about her possible deportation and experienced major separation anxiety. He was described as nervous and clingy after the raid, even though he had never displayed such symptoms before. He experienced repeated nightmares from which he sometimes awoke with uncontrollable shaking and loss of breath. He was taken to the hospital twice, and doctors diagnosed him with major anxiety disorder resulting from post-raid stress.

These outward behavioral changes provided only partial portraits of children's psychological health following the raids. Mental health professionals interviewed for the study emphasized that children's outward behaviors only offer glimpses of their true emotional states. They also said that children of different ages and developmental stages display symptoms differently, and that they have many different coping mechanisms. In the words of one teacher, "You see the two extremes, the loud kids who talk about it a lot or the quieter kids who clam up and don't say anything, so you don't even find out they've been affected for months."

Cultural barriers to obtaining mental health care. Mental health professionals interviewed for the study noted that it is not customary for low-income Latino immigrants to consider the stresses associated with migration and family separation as evidence of psychological trauma or a mental health disorder. The general reluctance of Latino immigrants to seek mental health care, combined with access issues such as cost of services and difficulties with interpretation and cultural

IMPLICATIONS

Children, especially younger children, are unlikely to understand why parents disappeared on the day of the raid, and may personalize their disappearance. Their anger at their parents and other symptoms may continue long after the parents return. Children may experience ongoing fears that they will be separated from their parents again.

Community-wide fears and tensions can increase the social isolation of affected families and children following the raids. Children face the stigma of having "illegal" parents. Other children with friends whose parents were arrested may have similar experiences.

Most mental health conditions are likely to go unnoticed and unaddressed following immigration enforcement worksite operations because Latino immigrants are often reluctant to seek mental health care.

competence, meant that children's and parents' mental health needs following the raids were seldom addressed. In fact, from all of our site work, we heard about only one parent who saw a psychologist regularly and only one child and two parents receiving prescription medications for mental health conditions. One health care provider said, "Typically in Latin American culture you don't think of depression, and you don't see a mental health therapist; you just think you're sad." Another provider said, "I don't think people think about this as a resource; they didn't associate the raid with any of the issues we deal with."

VII. Community Responses and Services to Children



In all three study sites, community leaders and institutions initiated intensive and broad response efforts to assist immigrant families after the raids. They mobilized quickly to bring immediate relief that helped many immigrants meet at least some of their basic, short-term needs. Due to the large-scale nature of the raids and the large number of families affected, relief efforts in all three sites took on community-wide dimensions. Community respondents from each site said that they approached the immediate aftermath of the raid as “disaster relief,” even though few had experience providing emergency relief to hundreds of families simultaneously. One community leader said, “It seemed as if everybody was really in disaster response mode; all agencies, all staff came to help out.”

Several common elements in the response strategies across all three sites were noted. All featured heavy involvement by churches and other faith-based organizations. Another commonality was some level of cooperation of various service providers to coordinate services. All shared a focus on immediate needs and short-term relief – especially housing, utilities, food, and clothing.

There were also significant differences in how assistance was delivered. There was variation in the centralization of leadership, coordination of service provision, and the roles played by the many groups providing assistance. The sites also varied in participation of state and local social service agencies. New Bedford was the only one of the three sites where a public agency, Massachusetts DSS, played a prominent and visible role in service delivery following the raids, though public health and social service agencies in Grand Island played supportive roles there. Finally, there were also

differences in the service delivery points established to assist families and in the cultural competency of service providers.

Overall, service delivery efforts in the sites involved a multitude of organizations and leaders, including faith-based providers and churches, state and local public institutions, community-based organizations, economic development organizations, business associations, informal cultural groups, and in some cases unions and the employers of the raided plants. Their various roles in fundraising, donating resources, coordinating services, managing and organizing service delivery, direct service provision, and advocacy are described in Appendix 3, including some of the details of service delivery that are not captured in the thematic discussion in this section of the report.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AS SAFE HAVENS AND DISTRIBUTION POINTS

A common element in all three study sites was the central role that churches and faith-based groups played in the provision of emergency relief. On the day of or within days of the raids, churches emerged as the places where many families converged and from which assistance was first delivered. In the longer term, churches used their many resources to support the families affected and ultimately absorbed a large portion of the impact of the economic, psychological, and spiritual crises that engulfed many families.

The key role of churches in the response efforts reflects the important role of religious institutions in Latino communities – especially among immigrant populations. Many Latinos traditionally gravitate toward the church for both communal life and as a spiritual venue. Especially in times of hardship, they first turn inward to their families, then toward trusted religious institutions and leaders, and lastly toward the government. Hence, it seems natural that churches emerged as safe havens where families could seek refuge and retain respect for their culture and values.

Aside from providing a safe environment, churches have certain characteristics that made them ideally suited for the responses required to reach undocumented immigrant families. The churches that were most involved in the study sites – Our Lady of Peace in Greeley, St. Mary's in Grand Island, and St. James and Our Lady of Guadalupe in New Bedford – have flexible hours and large gathering spaces that could hold hundreds of families during meetings and aid distribution. Because they did not compete with social service providers and other community organizations for funding, churches for the most part did not threaten other organizations and therefore were able to work with them easily. Unlike public agencies and many formal nonprofit service providers, churches did

not need to collect data on immigration status or verify other information on people seeking assistance – although other service providers based at the churches did require such verification. Churches provided a natural outreach and information mechanism, as many families regularly attend Mass on Sundays and during the week. Priests, pastors, and other church staff conducted considerable outreach, providing transportation for affected families and going door to door to deliver services. Finally, churches were able to raise substantial resources for relief efforts, both within their own parishes and from other churches and affiliated religious organizations. Respondents from all three sites expressed that identifying a church or a few churches from which to base their initial activities was one of their biggest successes.

Limitations of church-based assistance. At the same time, churches faced some limitations in providing assistance to affected families. In the longer run, they faced infrastructure and staff limitations that made it difficult to sustain the relief efforts. For instance, in Greeley almost all assistance was provided through Our Lady of Peace, and church staff there were soon overwhelmed. Even with one or two staff from Catholic Charities and other agencies based there, it was difficult for all families who needed assistance to get it in a timely fashion, given the extensive demand. While churches did not need to verify information about people seeking assistance, they worked with formal service providers that did require such verification – especially when using support from funders demanding accountability. Churches themselves then became embroiled in controversies over verification requirements, and this to some extent eroded their trust with the community.

IMPLICATIONS

Churches and other religious organizations can play key roles as safe havens, central distribution points, and avenues for outreach because immigrant communities tend to trust and find comfort in religious communities that embrace their culture. Churches and other religious institutions, however, may have significant infrastructure, staff, and other capacity limitations when compared with better-funded public and private service providers.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION OF SERVICES

In all three sites, the providers interviewed for the study reported that coordination among responding agencies was a greater challenge than lack of resources. A community leader in Greeley said, “Resources were adequate; there was a good response from the community. But the process of allocating the money, sending it through [to organizations], and handing it out took most of the time.” The director of a community group involved in the response effort in New Bedford added, “If anything, the money and donations came in almost too much, too fast.” Coordination emerged as the top concern because of the immediate needs of families, and because decisions about financial allocations had to be made swiftly as the money began to flow in within days after the

IMPLICATIONS

Disaster relief efforts benefit from centralized decision-making and a clear communications structure. The disaster relief model, which also applies to responses to large-scale immigration raids, reduces friction and competition among responding groups, improves accountability, and increases the efficiency and speed of service delivery.

raid took place. Donors required accountability, and this slowed down the process of aid distribution. Some degree of coordination and centralization of resources as well as information (e.g., the names of arrested immigrants) was necessary before assistance could be dispersed on a large scale and with proper accountability.

Respondents felt that service provision and allocation of assistance was more effective in New Bedford – where there was strong coordination organized by MIRA, the church, Catholic Charities, and Maya Kiche – than in the other two sites where an overall coordinating structure was lacking. Respondents also said that it was important to have regular meetings with a core group of organizations and providers to decide how to channel funds and develop service priorities. Such meetings were better attended and more effective in New Bedford, due in part to MIRA's facilitation, and in Grand Island through the Multicultural Coalition, than in Greeley where no such centralized leadership group existed. New Bedford and Grand Island,

which experienced greater coordination and collaboration across agencies, both began service delivery much more quickly than in Greeley, which had a more fractious service delivery structure and did not begin disbursing financial assistance for nearly two months.

THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP, CAPACITY, AND CULTURAL COMPETENCE

Coordination alone appeared to be insufficient to planning effective response efforts in the study sites. In the period immediately following the raids, local leadership, service delivery capacity, and cultural competence emerged as critical factors in enhancing community responses. In the study sites, leadership and capacity concerns included whether community-based organizations had adequate staff and funding, established networks of organizational relationships, experience in distributing assistance, and an adequate infrastructure on which to build a service delivery system. In all three sites there was a great deal of uncertainty about the capacity of the few small Latino CBOs playing leading roles in relief efforts. Another important consideration was whether these organizations had adequate cultural competence – the ability to communicate with, garner the trust of, and ultimately reach the affected communities.

Leadership. Several characteristics inherent to the membership organizations facilitated their role in the overall response effort. First, the membership coalitions by their very

nature sought to promote partnerships among groups, which served to lessen turf issues among other organizations competing for resources to help their constituency after the raids. Second, these organizations had long-standing relationships with several of the community groups involved in the response effort. Because of these features, the organizations were naturally poised to serve a convening role and to become the main communications forum.

In Grand Island and Greeley, leadership was largely developed from local organizations and community leaders. In Grand Island, the Multicultural Coalition formed a natural though informal umbrella under which community leaders from various organizations – public, nonprofit, and informal – were able to come together. In Greeley, local leadership emerged more informally and in a less coordinated (and occasionally fractious) fashion, for instance through Our Lady of Peace Parish, Catholic Charities, and Al Frente. Local leaders stepped forward not only to deliver services, but also to advocate for better service delivery and bring media attention to the plight of arrested immigrants.

In New Bedford, the local leadership of the clergy, Catholic Charities, and the New Bedford Office of the Mayor was expanded by MIRA, although MIRA was located nearly two hours away. The local community was able to draw on its resources when MIRA temporarily stationed staff locally to help coordinate the relief effort in the weeks following the raid. MIRA helped coordinate the initial local response effort including fundraising activities to create the Niños Fund, although their involvement waned in the few months after the raid. In New Bedford, the grassroots group best poised to serve the largest affected community, Maya Kiche, required a considerable influx of resources and technical assistance to build its capacity.

Service delivery capacity. In all three sites, most food and other basic assistance was provided outside the framework of formal public and private social service delivery systems. Churches and small community-based organizations grappled with the pressure to bring assistance to immigrants affected by the raids in their communities, but had very limited resources to dedicate to delivering assistance. The churches had very few staff, and so they relied heavily on volunteers and donations. Staff at churches, public social service agencies, and formal service providers also donated substantial amounts of personal time to helping families. All of this made it difficult to sustain relief activities over the longer run.

Latino CBOs such as Al Frente in Greeley and Maya Kiche in New Bedford were essential to the response efforts there. These smaller organizations scrambled to expand their capacity very quickly after the raids to meet the immediate needs of the local immigrant

communities they represented. Although greatly underfunded, these organizations provided the most effective outreach to arrested immigrants and their families; they were trusted organizations which the immigrant community often turned to for leadership and assistance. An influx of private donations, and in some cases money, from the larger organized effort helped these organizations scale up their capacity to assist families very quickly after the raid. Technical assistance and material support from other organizations with greater expertise and resources (e.g., MIRA in New Bedford) were crucial to helping the smaller organizations that lacked adequate staff and infrastructure.

Finally, in the short term at least, involvement in raid response activities required a great investment of resources, especially for organizations leading the effort or delivering key services. Several staff and directors from community groups said that their organizations turned exclusively to coordinating or delivering services in the days and weeks after the raid, but their involvement waned drastically over time. MIRA, for instance, estimated that almost 100% of its time was focused on relief efforts for about three weeks after the

raid. After transferring the organizational leadership to the foundation and the response effort's coordinating committee, its contribution dwindled to about 30% within two months. The coordinating committee structure was said to help diffuse the pressure on individual organizations to take on more than they could handle, although regular weekly meetings and other coordination efforts also took a toll on their staffing resources.

IMPLICATIONS

While it is rare for immigrant communities to be optimally situated with respect to leadership, service delivery capacity, and cultural competence, the more that these factors can be nurtured, the stronger and more effective the response model will be for assisting families.

Culturally competent leadership. Because the Latino immigrant community is set in culturally specific language, traditions, and values, it was especially important to have providers who have garnered the trust of the community and can communicate with immigrant families in a culturally relevant fashion. Several small, locally based organizations and community leaders in each city brought valuable culturally sensitive perspectives to the response

approaches in each city, steering organizational leaders to more effective strategies.

THE LIMITED ROLE OF PUBLIC AGENCIES

State and local public health and social service agencies had varying levels of involvement from site to site. Social service staff played a lead role in terms of coordination and referrals to services for families in Grand Island and a supportive role in creating access to services in New Bedford. In both sites, senior staff assisted in the

organization of emergency meetings after the raid to establish links between intervening organizations and to initiate services to families and outreach strategies. In all three study sites, social service agencies sent staff to churches shortly after the raid to assist affected families, and they stationed staff at churches and other service delivery locations temporarily.* In New Bedford, the Mayor's Office was closely involved, and Massachusetts DSS sent 35 Spanish-speaking social workers to Texas to interview detainees from New Bedford about their families and their assistance needs.

Variation in public assistance receipt from site to site. Few families sought public assistance in any of the three sites following the raids. In spite of outreach efforts, only about 25 families affected by the raid (or about 10% of families with arrested members) sought services from Nebraska DHS. Between 20 and 25 families, again about 10% of those affected by the raids, sought public assistance in Greeley. Similarly low numbers received some form of public assistance in New Bedford.

The local public health department in Grand Island undertook outreach efforts and provided coordination and service referrals. For example, health agency staff offered one-time free immunizations to immigrant children at a local church one weekend, while other staff distributed flyers which listed service locations and answered questions about eligibility for public programs.

Public agencies sought to extend services to U.S.-born citizen children even though their ability to provide direct assistance to undocumented parents and children was limited by federal and, in Colorado, state law.³⁰ Citizen children were mainly helped through the Food Stamp Program, which gives monthly food benefits to households, and were enrolled in Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). A few families received one-time special economic assistance to cover rent or house payments through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Some families also qualified for utility help through the Low-Income Housing Assistance Program.

State and local agencies also offered some services and benefits that were available to all those who needed assistance, regardless of citizenship and legal status. Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) offered food, milk, and other basic nutritional items for pregnant women and women with infants and toddlers. In fact, there was nearly universal receipt

* In Greeley there was criticism of the social service agency for sending staff to the church only on the weekends, and on fewer than six occasions.

of WIC for the youngest children of families who were interviewed in all three sites. Some state and local funds were available in all three sites for emergency assistance to help with rent, food, and transportation.*

Very few of the respondents had ever applied for or received cash assistance for their children, and only a small number of families applied for and received food stamps. For instance, according to the county social service office, only about five families with children were enrolled to receive food stamps in Greeley.

The major difference among the three sites was in the rate of enrollment of children in public health insurance programs. All but one of the young children of immigrants in New Bedford were enrolled in Medicaid or SCHIP, followed by about half of the children in Grand Island and fewer than 15 children (less than 10%) in Greeley.** Several of the parents whose children did not have health coverage said that they registered their children for health insurance for a short period after their birth, but subsequently declined further assistance. Overall, the majority of the undocumented immigrants interviewed for this study felt great reluctance to apply for or receive most types of public assistance.

Deterrents to seeking assistance from public agencies. Several factors influenced whether families sought or accepted assistance from public service agencies. Foremost among these was the fear that use of public benefits would result in being reported to immigration officials or otherwise damaging their chances of remaining in the United States.³¹ In Greeley, most affected families stayed away from the county social service office because of a sign posted there stating that any immigrant who presented false documents would be reported to the authorities. At the time the raid occurred, Colorado had just implemented a new state law requiring adults to provide identification and proof of citizenship or legal status when applying for public services. The law also established criminal penalties for anyone providing false or fraudulent identification.³²

Previous negative experiences in seeking public assistance may have also deterred affected families from seeking assistance. In general, undocumented and other immigrant

* For instance, in Greeley, support for emergency services for families was drawn from federal and state child welfare funds designated to prevent out-of-home placement of children.

** Two-thirds of the children (about 130) served by nonprofit providers in Greeley were U.S.-born citizens, and lack of citizenship was not a barrier to Medicaid or SCHIP enrollment for these children.

families may face hurdles when applying for assistance, such as language barriers, difficult application procedures, and questions about the legal status of household members.³³ Although the present study focused on Latino immigrants arrested in raids, it is likely that immigrants from non-Spanish-speaking countries would face even greater language hurdles when requesting assistance.

Another factor was absence of knowledge that U.S.-citizen children and other household members might be eligible to receive services and benefits. The undocumented parents who were arrested in all three sites were accustomed to relying on work income to support their children, and none of the parents were eligible for federal or state-funded assistance themselves. For many families, the raids represented the first time they needed to ask the government for assistance.

Familismo may also have deterred families from seeking assistance and limited their eligibility for some means-tested programs. In general, reliance on family networks has been found to deter Latino immigrants from seeking health care.³⁴ In addition, by moving into larger extended households with greater resources, affected families may have inadvertently made themselves ineligible for means-tested public programs such as food stamps or general assistance.

Finally, a pervasive perception that child welfare agencies would take their children away also accounted for immigrants' avoidance of public agencies after the raids. In Grand Island, as described earlier in the report, a recent public scandal over a child welfare case increased community concerns that child welfare authorities could not be trusted.

Community fears about the child welfare system created a difficult situation for the public agencies in all three sites following the raids. On the one hand, these agencies were charged with protecting children, and this meant that they had an obligation to ensure that the children had adult supervision, lived in a safe home environment, were adequately cared for, and had adequate basic necessities. On the other hand, fear prevented most affected families from engaging with or revealing any information to child welfare authorities, and so it was difficult for public agencies to know about the conditions in which

IMPLICATIONS

Public social service agencies can provide critical resources and assistance in relief efforts, and most affected children are eligible for federal and state-funded benefits because they are U.S. citizens. Undocumented immigrants, however, are generally afraid of seeking public assistance for their children due to fears that they will be arrested when seeking services and that child welfare authorities will take their children. Public agency administrators and staff are often unclear about what the implications are for the child welfare system and how staff and administrators can provide relevant services to immigrant families which are both responsive and culturally sensitive.

affected children were living. In addition, public agencies were not accustomed to dealing with undocumented immigrants – who seldom if ever approached them for assistance even prior to the raids – and so lacked knowledge or preparation to deal with some of the newer local immigrant populations such as the Maya Kiche. Child welfare agencies also faced uncertainty around the legal issues of working with undocumented parents and children.*

BARRIERS DUE TO SERVICE LOCATIONS AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The distribution location of the major forms of assistance affected take-up of services following the raids. The more centralized system in New Bedford was effective in reaching more families more quickly than in the other two sites where service delivery had to be moved (first to churches and later, in the case of Grand Island, out into the community). In New Bedford, although the organization of services was highly centralized, resource distribution occurred through multiple familiar and trusted sites such as churches, CBOs, and informal grassroots groups such as Maya Kiche. In Greeley, service delivery was much less centralized, offered primarily through a telephone hotline, the local Catholic Charities office, the food bank, and Our Lady of Peace Church. Most assistance was delivered at the church, because the other locations were not familiar or trusted sites for the local immigrant community. Informal grassroots organizations such as Al Frente were not part of the larger and better funded system of community response in Greeley. Service delivery was highly centralized in Grand Island, where the bulk of the resources were distributed through Central Nebraska Community Services (CNCS), which was not well-known to either the local Mexican or Guatemalan communities. Staff from CNCS were stationed at St. Mary's Cathedral following Mass, and offered some assistance there as well. When few families showed up at the church or CNCS the first week after the raid, service providers and community leaders began going door to door asking for families of arrested immigrants. In many cases, families did not open their doors for these leaders, even though they were known and trusted by the immigrant community. Food boxes and other assistance were often left on front steps of homes for these families.

* For more information, see Nebraska Appleseed, "Foster Care Reform Update," April 5, 2007, available at <http://www.neappleseed.org/lrc/040507.html>.

The amount and type of information requirements also posed hurdles for many families who sought assistance. Personal information requirements and documents proving that a relative or household member lost employment as a result of the raids were common at the service locations. Such information requirements were very important to ensure accountability and that assistance went to the families who needed it because of the raids. This was also a condition of service delivery from funders such as Swift & Company in Greeley and Grand Island, and the Community Foundation of Southeastern Massachusetts, in New Bedford. Service providers used forms, sometimes several pages long, which asked for detailed information about the identities of arrestees, their addresses, telephone numbers, household incomes, and number of children. In Greeley and Grand Island, service providers often had to match the real names of arrested immigrants (provided by ICE or the affected families) against aliases that they used for employment (provided by Swift).^{*} To receive rent, mortgage, and utility assistance – the big-ticket items in all three sites – applicants had to provide bills in their own names or prove that they paid some or all of these bills; this was not always easy in multiple-family households. In some cases, landlords were contacted to verify addresses and rents. All of these verification requirements significantly slowed down the application process, and some providers, for instance Al Frente in Greeley, preferred to distribute aid without any verification.

IMPLICATIONS

The typical centralized delivery model (“build it and they will come”) for providing services is generally not effective following immigration raids, when cultural barriers, limitations on eligibility for publicly funded services, and ongoing fears of arrest may increase the reluctance of immigrant families to seek assistance.

^{*} Service providers in Greeley were unable to obtain full lists of arrested immigrants from ICE or Swift until about two weeks after the raid, and this delay considerably slowed assistance delivery.

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations



Following the collapse of comprehensive immigration reform proposals in early 2007, Congress has failed to achieve consensus on the future of undocumented immigrants in the United States. This leaves approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country at risk of arrest and deportation, and about five million children – more than three million of whom are U.S. citizens – at risk of separation from their undocumented parents. The debate in Congress and in the public over the fate of undocumented immigrants – whether they should be legalized and allowed to stay in the country or denied employment and eventually forced to leave – has largely excluded any consideration for their children.

In the meantime, Congress has turned its focus to immigration enforcement and devoted additional resources to DHS for this purpose. The Administration and DHS have adopted a policy of vigorous enforcement which includes elements such as increased Border Patrol staffing and resources; increased capacity for detention and immigration courts; deportation of immigrants who have committed a wide range of crimes; pursuit of undocumented immigrants with outstanding deportation orders; and arrests of undocumented immigrants in workplaces.

Since the raid on Michael Bianco, Inc. in New Bedford in March, there have been worksite enforcement actions in at least nine states, with more than 700 immigrants arrested.³⁵ At the end of August 2007, for instance, ICE agents arrested more than 160 undocumented immigrants on administrative charges at a food processing plant in Ohio.³⁶ In July 2007, ICE arrested 20 more immigrants at the same Swift plants, including in Greeley and Grand Island, which were raided in December 2006.³⁷

Workplace arrests are an important item in ICE's arsenal of enforcement strategies; without access to employment, there is less incentive for undocumented migration. But as the aftermath of the recent worksite enforcement raids shows, workplace arrests inevitably affect large numbers of children. For every two adults arrested, there is on average at least one child affected. Two-thirds of these children are U.S.-born citizens; most are young children and many are the youngest and most vulnerable in our society – infants, toddlers, and preschoolers.

Immigration raids are intended to deter undocumented adults from working, not to punish children; however, as our research shows, raids have a wide range of adverse consequences for the entire family. Parents are separated from children for long periods of time, and children – especially younger children – cannot understand why this separation occurred. They are suddenly thrown into poverty, and their families are afraid to ask the government or other institutions for support. Some children witness the arrest of their parents, and others are stigmatized by being associated with “illegal” immigrants. Whole communities experience fear, and this fear leads to trauma for children, who experience symptoms of depression, separation anxiety and, in extreme cases, post-traumatic stress disorder.

Local immigrant communities and the state, local, and private institutions that serve them are ill-equipped to deal with the fallout of worksite raids, especially when they are large in scale. They do not have the resources, leadership, infrastructure, and cultural competence to meet the needs of all affected families, even those who overcome their fears and come forward to seek assistance. This report offers many factors to consider, strategies for support, and recommendations for state, local, and private institutions in the event of future raids. Yet, even if all of these recommendations were followed during every raid, it would only slightly alleviate the hardship and trauma experienced by immigrant families and their children.

States and local communities have borne the responsibility for children of immigrants arrested in worksite raids, just as they bear the consequences of many other U.S. immigration policies. They have paid the fiscal, social, and humanitarian costs in the aftermath of the raids. The federal government has largely been silent about the impact of these raids on children, and ICE has yet to fully acknowledge that worksite enforcement operations have harmful and long-lasting consequences for families. In fact, ICE has not issued public guidelines or regulations concerning the treatment of parents during their arrest, detention, and deportation.

Children are the most vulnerable members of society, and so the United States, like most other nations, has developed systems to protect them. These systems are designed to meet children's basic needs such as food, shelter, and health care, and to keep them safe from psychological and physical harm. Yet, these systems cannot replace parents when they are taken away from their children. Current U.S. immigration policy mandates the arrest of undocumented parents, and by extension causes separation of parents from children. Millions of U.S. children will continue to be at substantial risk of separation from their parents, economic hardship, and psychological duress until federal policy-makers recognize the impact of immigration policies on children and change those policies accordingly.

Beyond the broad concern about the lack of protection for children following worksite enforcement operations, the research also raised many concrete concerns about how worksite raids are conducted and community responses to them. The following recommendations address some of these.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS

- Congress should provide oversight of immigration enforcement activities to ensure that children are protected during worksite and other operations.
- Congress should revise the rules concerning release, deportation, and banishment of noncitizens charged with nonviolent offenses such as identity theft, so that arrested parents can be reunited with their children in cases where children face hardship.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

- ICE should assume that there will be children, and likely very young children, affected whenever adults are arrested in worksite enforcement operations. ICE should not assume that there are no children involved just because arrestees do not divulge this information to immigration agents.
- ICE should consider how the show of force and treatment of arrestees affect children psychologically – including older children who may witness enforcement activities – and plan operations accordingly.
- ICE should allow attorneys, consular staff, and other intermediaries speedy access to all arrested immigrants before they sign any legal documents. ICE should inform

detainees of their right to counsel and to home country consular officials.* All arrested immigrants should be given lists of pro bono attorneys and other legal resources. Those charged with nonimmigration offenses should be notified of their rights and given access to legal representation.

- ICE should allow arrestees access to telephones within a short time after arrest, and ensure confidentiality of telephone conversations. ICE should also take into consideration whether or not arrestees have children and whether or not arrestees have strong community connections when determining the location of their detention.
- ICE should develop a consistent policy for release of parents arrested in enforcement operations. Single parents and primary caregivers of young children should be released early enough in the day so that school children and children in child care do not experience disruptions in care; they should not be held overnight. Parents should be released quickly even when there are two parents in the home because the second parent often cannot function alone.
- ICE and the immigration court system should allow for a speedy resolution of arrested immigrants' disposition, to allow families to make final decisions concerning the care and well-being of their children.
- ICE should notify community institutions as soon as possible after enforcement operations so that the institutions can prepare responses, and should provide information on arrested immigrants – including the location of their detention – to these institutions in a timely fashion.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS

- Schools should develop systems to help ensure that children have a safe place to go in the event of a raid, and to reduce the risk that children will be left without adult supervision when the school day ends.
- Children may need academic and other counseling for an extended period of time following a raid, just as they would after any other major disruptive event.
- Schools, churches, and other community institutions should have forums to discuss the aftermath of the raids and to reduce community fears and tensions. Ongoing work to help heal communities and bridge immigrant with nonimmigrant communities may be necessary to reduce these fears and tensions.

* Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 596, 1963, p. 261) provides that if a person detained by a foreign country “so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving state shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending state” of such detention and “inform the person concerned without delay of his rights” to consular representation. Available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS

- Social service and other public agencies should prepare plans to respond to immigration raids and develop outreach strategies to assure parents and other caregivers that it is safe to seek emergency assistance and benefits for children under such circumstances. States and local governments should develop policies that ensure the confidentiality of undocumented parents seeking assistance for U.S.-citizen children, instead of policies that put parents at risk of arrest if they seek services.
- Relationships with various immigrant networks within a community must be established, nurtured, and grown well in advance and should be part of any community response plan.
- Organizations involved in relief efforts should develop centralized systems for coordination and communication which involve representation from a broad range of key groups, including public officials and agencies, nonprofit service providers, religious institutions, community-based groups, and immigrant community leaders. National, regional, and state-level organizations should develop programs to help local communities develop rapid responses to immigration raids.
- Outreach to families as well as efforts to contact arrested parents who are in detention may be necessary to gain information about the living situations of children and overcome parents' and other caregivers' fears about revealing such information. Additional outreach to children who are staying with babysitters or nonrelatives or living with other children – especially in the case of adolescents – may be necessary to determine children's needs and whether their living conditions are safe.
- Churches and other religious institutions should be considered as central points of communication, distribution of assistance, and outreach to families affected by immigration enforcement operations because they are trusted institutions that can serve families confidentially. Additional support from outside sources and coordination among several churches may be needed to raise funds and provide the infrastructure necessary for a large-scale response.
- Resources for social services and economic assistance will likely be needed over a prolonged period of time, often many months, until parents are released from detention and their immigration cases are resolved. During this time efforts should be made to help families find longer-term sources of support, obtain employment for adults who were not arrested, or potentially relocate.

- Mental health services should be a key component of and tied to other response efforts. Services should include outreach to affected families – potentially through schools, churches, and other trusted institutions – to reduce reluctance to seek care and to help overcome language, cultural, and other access barriers.
- Legal services should also be made available to arrested immigrants; for instance, through lists of pro bono lawyers or nonprofit legal services organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERS

- Communities should prepare networks to obtain and disseminate information on children whose parents are arrested, and conduct outreach to find children whose families are in hiding. Such planning should be conducted well in advance of any ICE enforcement activity to increase its effectiveness.
- Communities should focus on providing support and assistance to the extended families of arrested immigrants, along with other caregivers in extended community networks. Backup plans should be in place for situations in which informal family and social networks prove insufficient.
- Relatives, friends, community leaders, and service providers should develop plans for single-parent immigrant families in the event of a parent's arrest and be ready to provide ICE with necessary documentation for the parent's release. They may also need to provide extra psychological support to some mothers in two-parent families while their husbands are detained to prevent the mothers from becoming isolated.
- Immigrant families should prepare legal documents that would enable them to transfer custody or guardianship of their children in the event of arrest.
- Immigration lawyers, advocates, community leaders, and others should be honest with arrested immigrants about their chances of remaining in the United States, and strategic in choosing which cases to fight. Arrested immigrants should not have to pay large legal fees for cases with low probabilities of success, especially when they are already facing substantial economic hardship.
- A national clearinghouse of information about responses to raids should be developed. Such a clearinghouse could be a repository for stories about raids, a conduit for sharing information, and a setting for developing best practices in service delivery.

IX. Appendices



APPENDIX 1

Methodology

Site selection. A large sample of children whose parents were arrested in worksite raids was needed to conduct the analysis in this study. To this end, three sites were chosen based on the number of people arrested in recent raids. The bulk of the arrests in all three sites occurred at large manufacturing plants, but a small numbers of arrests occurred in other locations at the same time in all three sites. Two sites had about 275 arrestees each, and the third had about 360 arrestees.*

The site visits took place within a short period of time, but not immediately, after the worksite enforcement actions. In one of the sites, the raid took place about two months before the first site visit and three months before the second. In the other two sites, where only one site visit was conducted, the raids took place between five and six months before the visit.

Sites were chosen to represent geographic diversity. Although all are cities with a population of 50,000 to 100,000, one is located in the West, one in the Midwest, and the third in the Northeast.

* The exact number of arrestees depends on whether data were obtained from ICE, immigration lawyers, service providers, or other sources. Related raids occurred at other employers and within the community on the same day as the main raids that we studied.

Sites were also chosen based on the National Council of La Raza's (NCLR) field contacts. NCLR funded intermediary organizations, generally immigrant CBOs and coalitions, to provide connections to local-level contacts and help schedule site visits. Given the tight time frame of the study (all site work was conducted in May and June 2007) the assistance of these intermediary organizations was essential to conducting the work. The organizations also helped gain the trust of community leaders and CBOs, which was essential to completing the research.

Finally, it was critical that the sites include a broad mix of public officials, public and private service providers, community leaders, and other study respondents who would be willing to talk to us. Most important among these were the arrestees and their immediate family members who were very generous in granting us their time and their trust as we conducted the field research.

Respondents in the sites. There were four types of study respondents. First, community respondents were chosen from among the following institutions and locations within each of the three sites:

- Employers (in two of the sites)
- State and local public agencies providing services to families affected by the raids
- Nonprofit service providers
- Churches and faith-based organizations
- Public schools
- Grassroots organizations and local community leaders
- Immigration lawyers
- Consulates for countries with nationals arrested in the raids.

Community respondents were interviewed individually or in groups of three or less. Interviews were conducted in person in most cases. A small number of introductory and follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone, and they lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. A total of 72 interviews were conducted with 91 community respondents for the study.

Second, 30 caregivers were interviewed individually (28 in person and two over the phone) among the three sites. Caregivers included mostly parents who had been arrested and released, as well as spouses of parents who had been detained or deported. Some

caregivers were also relatives such as aunts or uncles.* Caregivers were recruited by local immigrant community leaders, faith-based organizations, CBOs, and other community leaders. These interviews, which were held in people's homes or other safe locations such as churches, also lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.

Third, in two of the sites focus groups were conducted with social workers who had direct contact with arrestees and their children.** These focus groups also lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.

Finally, a small number of national-level experts on immigration raids, arrests, and deportations were interviewed prior to the site work.

Structure of interviews and focus groups. Semi-structured discussion guides were used for all of the interviews and focus groups. These guides were designed to collect information in a standardized fashion for different sites and types of respondents. They were designed to elicit both detailed answers to specific questions (e.g., How many children had parents who were arrested in the raids?) as well as open-ended responses to broader questions (e.g., What were the strengths and weaknesses of community responses to the raids?). The guides included components for different areas of inquiry, which mostly follow the flow of this report. The guides were designed so that different respondents could answer different groups of questions; respondents were not expected to have expertise on all areas of inquiry. The main components of the discussion guides were:

- Background on the interviewee(s) and the community where the raid took place
- Number of immigrants arrested and children affected, along with their characteristics
- Details of what happened on the day of the raid
- Details of what happened to arrestees in terms of detention, release from detention, and deportation
- Discussion of the immediate impact on children and families
- Discussion of longer-term impact on children and families
- Community responses to the raids
- Insights and recommendations

* We did not interview any parents in detention or any who had been deported.

** One of these groups included five people, and the second included 12 people.

Fieldwork approach. Discussions with intermediary organizations and a first set of contacts guided us toward diverse community leaders, service providers, and other key respondents. In each site we also attempted to contact everyone who had been quoted in the media, and in most cases we were successful. Focus groups of social service, child protective, and mental health case workers were organized through local community respondents.

Caregivers were contacted through formal and informal networks, both through intermediary organizations and some of our local community respondents. In each site, a snowball sampling technique was used, starting from at least two different points of contact, to ensure that respondents did not all originate from the same source. Caregiver interviews took place in safe settings such as churches, community-based organizations, and, in some cases, people's homes. A small number of interviews were also conducted over the phone.

Confidentiality of respondents and study sites. Study respondents were very candid in their interviews with us, and strict measures have been taken to protect their confidentiality. All respondents were guaranteed anonymity, and their responses were rephrased in many cases to protect their confidentiality. The Urban Institute's Institutional Review Board reviewed the study methodology, interview discussion guides, and data collection and storage techniques for confidentiality and protection of human subjects.

Data obtained and analyses conducted. For each site, we collected as much data as possible on the number of children affected and their characteristics (age, citizenship status, etc.) from different sources. Data were also collected on the number of arrestees, their countries of origin, and their status (e.g., detained locally, detained in another state, released on bond, deported) both immediately following the raids and at the time of the site visits. Complete data on the number of arrestees with children, along with the number of children and their characteristics, were only available for one site based on a list of all arrestees. For the other two sites, there was no such comprehensive list of arrestees combined with data on children, so the report relies on counts of families with children and their characteristics, where available, from multiple sources: schools, service providers, and lawyers. For these two sites, the number of children included in the report are incomplete and therefore represent an undercount.

The number of arrestees with children; number of children; and their age, citizenship status, and other characteristics are compared with national data based on the 2005

March Current Population Survey (CPS) augmented with Urban Institute assignments of legal status to noncitizens. The methods for assigning legal status generally involved adding up all of the noncitizens in the CPS data and subtracting the number of known legal immigrants based on DHS admissions data; the difference between the total number of noncitizens and number of legal noncitizens was roughly equal to the number of undocumented immigrants. Once the total number of undocumented immigrants was obtained, then the undocumented were differentiated from legal noncitizens using a probabilistic procedure based on data from the 1990-92 Legalized Population Survey.³⁸ The purpose of the national data comparison was to provide a framework for understanding the potential scope and impact of raids conducted thus far and future raids on children.

Key themes, details of events, and individual stories were selected from our three primary sources of information: community respondents, focus group participants, and parents and other caregivers. Findings were grouped based on the immediate impact on children, potential longer-term impact, and local service respondents which appear as sections in this report. Cross-cutting themes across sites and types of respondents and categories of questions were described where possible.

Respondents were asked for their specific recommendations regarding policy changes and planning for future community responses to worksite raids. Their suggestions are included in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of the report.

Also incorporated into this report was information from media reports on the raids in the three study communities and academic literature on immigration enforcement, children with incarcerated parents, and the impact of parent-child separation on child development and well-being.

Study limitations. The study was exploratory in nature, and field work was completed within the short time frame of only two months. In many cases the research uncovered more questions than answers.

Respondents were not selected randomly, but through intermediary organizations and key contacts on the ground in each site. Thus, despite snowball sampling starting from more than one origin in each site, the sample of caregivers included in the report is not representative of the arrestees' population or of the population of spouses or other relatives. The sources of our connection to individual interviewees may introduce bias, but in each site we used more than one initial point of contact. Focus groups do not

allow for statistical representation of findings either. However, rich themes and compelling stories were uncovered from our site visits.

The findings rely on respondents' memories of what occurred during that time because site visits were conducted between two and six months after the raids. Conversely, because the site visits occurred within six months of the raids, only limited pictures of longer-term consequences for children were captured. Further research into long-term impact will be necessary over a longer time frame.

APPENDIX 2

Profiles of the Study Sites

SITE 1: Greeley, Colorado. Greeley is a small city located approximately 100 miles northeast of Denver, with a 2005 population of between 75,000 and 90,000, of whom about one-third were Latinos.³⁹ The city is a manufacturing, banking, and services center for a large agricultural area. It is also a bedroom community for Denver and has experienced very rapid population growth of middle-class commuters in recent years. The rapid growth in the commuter population led to an explosion in the housing market followed by a steep decline in housing prices and a high foreclosure rate within the past year.

According to study respondents, the Mexican-origin community dates back more than 100 years to migrants from New Mexico and Texas. More recently, former *braceros* – temporary agricultural workers in the United States during the 1940s through the 1960s – and migrants from northern Mexico have moved into the community. Most recently, within the past eight to ten years, migrants from Central and Southern Mexico, along with Guatemalans, have come in large numbers. Salvadorans, Peruvians, and other Central and South Americans also have small populations in the area.

The Latino population remains highly segregated in the area near the plant that was raided and surrounding agricultural areas. Long-standing segregation persists because of restrictive covenants that limited where Latinos could live until the 1960s. More recently, there have been tensions between immigrants and others in the community over immigrant integration and competition for employment opportunities.

This city has a strong but uneven economy with unemployment averaging between 4.5% and 5% in 2006.⁴⁰ The raid occurred at a meatpacking plant owned by Swift & Company at the time. The plant is the largest employer in town and has been in operation under various owners since the 1950s. Other manufacturing facilities, banking and insurance businesses, and a university are also major employers. Most of these employers require its employees to possess substantially more education than that of the average undocumented Latino worker. Latino immigrants work primarily in lower-skilled manufacturing, agriculture, construction, landscaping, and service positions.

Assembly-line jobs at the manufacturing plant paid \$10-\$15 per hour before the raid. The jobs were full-time, unionized, and included inexpensive family health insurance along with other benefits. Many immigrants worked double shifts, earning substantial overtime

wages. But the extent of overtime varied seasonably with product demand. Respondents told us that families with two workers at this wage could achieve a decent standard of living. Wages are slightly higher in construction but lower in other major industries of immigrant employment.

Plant turnover was only about a quarter before the raids, meaning that the average worker was there for about four years. Some of the arrested workers had been working at the plant ten years or more. According to respondents, many Latinos owned their own homes and automobiles before the raid. Among the arrested immigrants, those from Mexico had been in the community the longest – or had relatives or acquaintances in town the longest – and they tended to be well integrated. Guatemalans tended to be more recent arrivals, although they too had been in town for many years on average. Guatemalans were less likely than Mexicans to have large, extended family networks or own their own homes or other assets.

SITE 2: Grand Island, Nebraska. The second community visited for the study, Grand Island, is a small city in Central Nebraska – about 100 miles west of Omaha – with a 2005 population of between 65,000 and 70,000, about one-sixth of whom were Latino.⁴¹ This city is also a manufacturing, banking, and services center for a large agricultural area, but unlike Greeley, it does not include a large bedroom community of commuters. The Swift plant there had experienced an immigration raid in 1992.

Grand Island has been experiencing slow population growth, but substantial economic prosperity with 3% unemployment in recent years.⁴² Many of the surrounding smaller communities in Central Nebraska also have manufacturing plants with large numbers of Latino workers.

Although the Mexican-origin population is larger, Guatemalan immigrants have a significant presence in the town and surrounding region. Some families can trace roots back 75 years, and a substantial number of Guatemalan immigrants arrived during the 1980s and 1990s. The largest wave of migration, however, occurred within the past five years, with the Maya Kiche moving to the area; they speak neither English nor standard Spanish.

The Latino community in Grand Island is relatively dispersed with less residential segregation than in Greeley, and there is a strong Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. There are also strong connections to other Latino communities throughout the state.

As in Greeley, the raid site was a Swift & Company meatpacking plant and the largest employer in town. Other manufacturing plants in the area also employ a substantial number of workers. Assembly-line jobs at the plant paid \$10-\$15 per hour before the raid. Six months after the raid, jobs at the plant were paying up to \$17 per hour to start and offering large signing bonuses. Respondents told us that families with two workers at this wage could achieve a decent standard of living. Wages are slightly higher in construction but lower in the other major industries of Latino immigrant employment, such as services and agriculture.

The plant jobs are full-time, unionized, and include inexpensive health insurance, along with other benefits. Some immigrants work Saturdays to earn overtime. In conjunction with the local community college, the plant offers adult education programs – including English courses – for employees.

The Swift plant had about a 30% turnover before the raids, meaning that the average worker had been there a little longer than three years. Some of the arrested workers had been there ten years or more. Some of the immigrants who were arrested owned their own homes, but the majority were renters. Homeownership among Latinos appeared to be lower than in Greeley, at least according to study respondents.

SITE 3: New Bedford, Massachusetts. The third community, New Bedford, is a small city in Massachusetts, with a 2006 population of between 90,000 and 105,000; Latinos composed about one-eighth of this population.⁴³ It is a major seaport with an old industrial base and high unemployment in recent years due in part to manufacturing job losses. The major industries are textile and other manufacturing, maritime, fishing, transportation, wholesale trade, and others associated with the port. Unemployment averaged between 6.5% and 7% during 2006, much higher than the two other sites and well above the national average.⁴⁴

The longer-term immigrant community is of Portuguese and Portuguese-colonial descent (mostly from Cape Verde and Brazil), but more recently large numbers of Central American immigrants have moved into the area. El Salvador and Guatemala are the largest countries of origin for the workers of the raided plant; many Guatemalans are Maya Kiche who have difficulty speaking and understanding both English and Spanish. There is also a significant Honduran community, and a small number of immigrants from Mexico. The Central American immigration flow started with refugees from the civil war in Guatemala during the 1980s, but most of the population growth is recent, occurring within the last ten years.

Michael Bianco, Inc., the raided plant, was one of the 15 largest employers in New Bedford. It is a textile operation and was making backpacks for the military at the time of the raid. Wages are low (just \$7 to \$9) relative to the cost of living – which is high in the city and surrounding area – and few immigrants can afford their own houses. Most live in crowded apartment settings.

According to study respondents, Latino immigrants live in the poorer areas of New Bedford, but are divided with the Maya Kiche living on one side of town and the Spanish-speaking Central Americans on the other. Most of these immigrants are renters.

APPENDIX 3

Overview of Service Delivery in the Sites

Service delivery efforts in the sites involved a multitude of organizations and leaders, including faith-based providers and churches, state and local public institutions, CBOs, economic development organizations, business associations, informal cultural groups, and in some cases unions and the employers of the raided plants. Their various roles included fundraising, donating resources, coordinating services, and managing and organizing service delivery, direct service provision, and advocacy. Due to the limited, exploratory nature of our study, the following general descriptions of service delivery in the three sites include the major relief efforts undertaken but do not include all forms of assistance delivered.

New Bedford, Massachusetts. The response effort in New Bedford featured relatively strong centralized leadership and coordination of providers and key elements of service delivery, centralized resource inflows and allocation of funds, and a strong supportive role by the public social service system. New Bedford benefited by its proximity to Boston and the substantial legal, social service, and advocacy resources based there.

The response effort was initially facilitated by MIRA. MIRA stepped in to fill a local vacuum, as there was no single organization in New Bedford which represented the affected immigrant groups (predominantly Hondurans and Maya Kiche from Guatemala) and had the capacity to organize a large-scale response. MIRA had greater resources than local groups, including staff to coordinate the response effort. One respondent said, “[MIRA] took an all-hands-on-deck model to the response, and this is what will be required in similar raids of this scale and scope.”

On the day of the raid, MIRA launched the first communications efforts and began networking with the key groups that would eventually work together on the response effort. As word of the raid spread, several conference calls were initiated with key local community and faith-based groups. The groups acted swiftly to convene a multitude of service providers and community organizers with the families. More than 400 families and individuals affected by the raid attended this convening, which was held in the basement of a large church on the evening of the raid. Various service providers and community organizations set up booths on one side of the room to collect information on the identities of the families, and referrals to services were set up on the other side.

Within days, the core group of first-responders created a new superstructure which included a formal leadership committee to serve as the central organizing body for coordinating service delivery for the response effort. The Niños Fund was established to receive donations. The Southeastern Massachusetts Community Foundation was chosen as the fiscal agent and overall administrator. The decision-making committee included representatives from the main service providers, thus helping them become involved in the allocation of resources. The committee included staff from MIRA, the Mayor's Office of New Bedford, several churches and other faith-based institutions, and various community-based organizations, including a nonprofit immigrant assistance and referral center and an economic development organization. The weekly committee meetings also served as the key communications system. While this superstructure at times produced some tension and conflict among participants, nearly all of the study respondents had a positive opinion of the basic approach.

The Niños Fund, which had collected \$145,000 by the time of our visit two months after the raid, provided a comprehensive range of direct assistance to families with children. A portion of the fund was also used to build capacity among the organizations providing direct assistance. Most of the direct assistance funds went toward emergency needs including housing assistance, food assistance, utilities, and transportation. Distribution of aid began just three days after the raid. Three organizations distributed about \$25,000 in food assistance in the form of grocery store gift cards and vouchers. About \$60,000 in vouchers went toward rent payments for up to two months. Another portion of funds went to a nonprofit community action agency to help families pay for utilities. A local CBO and several churches offered transportation assistance (e.g., to take arrestees to and from their court appointments).

Multiple service distribution sites were chosen, each familiar to the immigrant families targeted for assistance: Catholic Charities; the Community Economic Development Corporation (CEDC); the Immigrant Assistance Center, a long-standing immigrant assistance and referral center; and Maya Kiche. Maya Kiche was a key organization because it was the only group that had the language capacity, cultural competency, and trust to work with the Mayan immigrants from Guatemala who composed the single-largest ethnic group arrested in the raid.

The State of Massachusetts also took a proactive, unique role in assisting the immigrants arrested in the raid. Under the governor's orders, Massachusetts DSS arranged for child welfare workers to meet with detained immigrants within three days of the raid to assess and make recommendations for release based on their family circumstances.

Massachusetts DSS workers helped obtain the release of 20 parents and other caregivers without bond within a few days after the raid. DSS staff were also present at service provider meetings and community events.

New Bedford also had access to substantial nonprofit legal resources, mostly provided out of Boston offices. Legal aid was offered by both Greater Boston Legal Services and a lawyer from Catholic Charities who specializes in immigration issues.

Grand Island, Nebraska. The response effort in Grand Island was less centralized than in New Bedford, but was coordinated informally and funded primarily by the employer (at that time, Swift & Company), the union (United Food and Commercial Workers), and other private sources. Community leaders in Grand Island were ready to respond when the raid happened because of experience with a previous raid at the same plant in the late 1990s. But Grand Island could not draw on the same level of resources from nearby cities, as was the case in New Bedford and Greeley, because the community is relatively isolated, located about 100 miles west of Omaha.

Several community leaders and institutions came together under the umbrella of the Grand Island Multicultural Coalition, a preexisting independent nonprofit membership organization dedicated to networking and coalition-building to better serve the needs of the area's Latino and other minority ethnic populations. The coalition, which already had participation from broad sectors of the community (including Swift, Nebraska DHS, public schools, nonprofit service providers, and local churches), facilitated connections among responding organizations and sponsored and provided the space for numerous meetings.

Out of concern for the school children, the Grand Island school district played a lead role in coordinating and providing assistance to families, starting on the day of the raid. The district had developed plans in the event of a raid at the Swift plant, based on the experience with the previous raid there. The superintendent held several press conferences throughout the day reassuring immigrant families that their children were safe at school. English as a second language program staff took the lead in convening meetings of community leaders, delivering assistance directly to families' homes, and referring immigrant parents to available services. The public schools became safe havens for children and an information pipeline for the community in the days and weeks after the raid. The district had developed a database of parents' employers, and used this database to contact all children whose parents might have been arrested at Swift.

The Swift plant had a history of strong, positive relations with the Latino community –

the source of most of its employees – and had been providing services such as adult education and English as a second language to some of its employees. Following the raid, Swift provided about \$60,000 in funding to the local United Way for assistance to families of employees arrested at the plant. United Way disbursed the funds mostly through CNCS, an established nonprofit service provider, although assistance was provided at other locations. Swift provided a list of employees who had been arrested and stipulated that the funds be spent on assistance to families of employees. CNCS verified that recipients of assistance were in fact relatives or housemates with arrested employees. CNCS assisted affected families with a range of basic needs including housing, food, utilities, medical expenses, and other daily living expenses. CNCS served more than 100 families with almost 200 children. Families were allocated about \$200 each during the first month following the raid, but assistance payments rose in value to \$700 in subsequent months. Assistance lasted through about the fourth month after the raid.

Beginning on the Sunday after the raid, churches conducted impromptu food and cash drives and were able to start disbursing mostly one-time cash allocations and gift cards funded by Swift. They also arranged for meetings with the Mexican Consulate and offered transportation assistance. St. Mary's Cathedral, in downtown Grand Island, became a central point of distribution. The Omaha Hispanic Chamber of Commerce raised funds and donations from the Latino community there and brought food, toys, clothes, and other items to Grand Island.

Much of the distribution of food and other basic items was done in the community during the first few weeks after the raid with volunteers going door to door. Because so many families were in hiding and afraid of ongoing ICE raids, they did not go anywhere – not even to the church – to seek assistance.

Nebraska DHS and the city health department also anchored much of the response effort in Grand Island, although the role of public agencies was more limited than in New Bedford and families were afraid to go to these agencies. Agency staff assisted mainly with service coordination, setting up avenues of assistance and offering referrals. Staff from both the health department and social service agency assisted with assembling service points throughout the community (e.g., at CNCS, the Salvation Army, and St. Mary's); staffed the delivery of services at various sites; and referred immigrant families to specific agencies and organizations for food, financial assistance, and other services. Nebraska DHS was limited in the forms of assistance it could provide because

undocumented immigrants are ineligible for most federal and state-funded programs – such as the Food Stamp Program and TANF. In many families, U.S.-born citizen children were eligible for public assistance, but families were afraid to ask for assistance from Nebraska DHS for fear of losing their children to the child welfare system.

The Mexican Consulate in Omaha was involved in coordinating and delivering some of the services. Consular officials were the first to interview arrestees detained in Iowa the day after the raid, and the first to get detailed information about children of arrestees. Consular officials linked detainees and family members via phone and also set up connections with immigration attorneys, as attorneys had difficulty gaining access to the Iowa detainees for several days. The Consulate provided a small amount – about one week's worth of cash assistance – to Mexican families following the raid. The Mexican Consulate also put some detainees from other countries of origin in contact with their families and with lawyers. However, arrested immigrants from other countries of origin did not receive a similar level of consular services because they did not have consulates in the area. For instance, the nearest Guatemalan consulate was in Chicago.

The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) represented most of the workers arrested at the plant and provided some cash assistance and relief as well. The union hired an attorney out of Omaha to help with about a dozen immigration cases. UFCW also provided assistance to families in obtaining the arrested workers' last paychecks and receiving compensation for unused vacation and other leave.

Nebraska Appleseed, based out of Lincoln, and another nonprofit in Omaha offered some free legal assistance as well. However, Grand Island itself had no trustworthy immigration attorneys or accredited Board of Immigration Appeals representatives, i.e., people who could represent clients before immigration judges. St. Mary's Cathedral was in the process of training two people to become accredited representatives and setting up a legal assistance program at the time of the raid. The lack of legal resources in Grand Island and generally across Nebraska limited avenues for arrested immigrants to appeal their deportation, and in some cases they used untrustworthy lawyers or legal consultants and lost substantial sums of money for legal fees.

Greeley, Colorado. The response effort in Greeley was the least centralized of the three sites, and public agencies played the smallest role there. There was no single coalition or organizational structure that formally coordinated relief, although efforts were informally coordinated through Our Lady of Peace, a local Catholic Church that served as the central distribution point for most assistance. Congregations Building Communities (CBC), a

church-based organizing group, facilitated the first meeting at Our Lady of Peace and continued to work with the church to provide services to affected families. CBC also connected the media with affected families so that they could tell their stories.

Greeley benefited from its proximity to the Denver area, where immigration lawyers, two consulates (Mexico and Guatemala), a large Latino community, and other resources are located. Greeley did not have experience with a prior raid, however, and the community was deeply divided over county government plans to petition ICE to open an office in town. Moreover, one of the worst snowstorms in years hit the area about one week following the raid, which greatly complicated service provision during this critical period.

The Swift plant's donation and United Way coordination drove most of the relief efforts in Greeley. As in Grand Island, Swift donated about \$60,000 to United Way, predicated on the condition that the money be spent only on families with arrested employees. Swift also forwarded a list of arrested immigrants to United Way, which in turn coordinated the relief effort through a local nonprofit service provider – in this case, Catholic Charities. United Way provided another \$25,000 raised through other sources. Catholic Charities branches in the Denver area provided additional sources of funding. In total, about \$200,000 was raised; \$140,000 in excess of the Swift seed grant and far above the total amount available in Grand Island. Catholic Charities served 96 families and more than 200 children. Families were allocated \$500 each at the start of the process, but the cap was raised by several hundred dollars as families came back during the second, third, and fourth months after the raid for assistance. Some families received assistance with rent and mortgage payments as high as \$1,200. Rent and mortgage assistance was the single-largest item; more than \$70,000 was spent on assisting 90 families during the four months following the raids. More than \$7,000 of the United Way funding was spent on food, coordinated through the local food bank. Our Lady of Peace distributed more than \$12,000 in gift cards for use at local grocery stores, some of which were funded out of the United Way/Catholic Charities pool and some of which were donated by the stores.

Immediately following the raid, United Way organized services through Catholic Charities, the local food bank, and a toll-free (211) number. They used the 211 system which had been effective in previous disaster assistance efforts, for instance the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Following the workplace raid in Greeley, however, this system was not as effective. There were not that many calls to the toll-free number, and not very much assistance was disbursed during the first month following the raid.

Also, very few people went to the offices of the food bank or the Catholic Charities office to seek assistance. As in Grand Island, families were too frightened following the raids to go to formal service providers, either public or private.

Our Lady of Peace held a meeting the evening after the raid and another later in the week. Weld County Department of Social Services (Weld DSS), Catholic Charities, and other major service providers in town, the union, the Guatemalan and Mexican Consulates, and community leaders came to these initial meetings. Meetings of the service providers continued on a weekly basis for several months. Moreover, many families attended the first meeting held in the basement of the church – informal estimates of attendance ran as high as 400. In fact, a large number of families were already in the church celebrating Our Lady of Guadalupe, a major Latin American festival, at the time the raid happened. Some of these families remained in the church in hiding the day of the raid. Our Lady of Peace is located in the heart of the Latino community in Greeley, only a few blocks from the raided plant. Due to its location and trust within the community, Our Lady of Peace became a safe haven and central distribution point following the raid.

Many families came to Our Lady of Peace seeking assistance in the days following the raid. The priests and other staff at the church raised some funding and received donations of food and other items from the Latino community in Greeley and other churches nearby. However, the large number of families seeking assistance quickly overwhelmed their capacity. In addition, the staff at the church did not have the capacity to manage the large pool of resources offered by United Way. As a result of these difficulties, the group of community leaders and service providers that was meeting regularly decided to base staff from Catholic Charities and the food bank at Our Lady of Peace to distribute assistance, track recipients, and verify their connections to arrested immigrants. It took almost one month to get this system set up because of difficulties in coordinating assistance and a two-week delay in getting the list of arrested immigrants from ICE via Swift. Thus, distribution of the major component of assistance – rent and mortgage payments – did not begin until the second month after the raid. Assistance continued for about three months, but this operation had largely closed down and the funding had all been spent by the time of our site visit, five months after the raid.

Al Frente, a community-based organization located just a few blocks from Our Lady of Peace and the Swift plant, also provided significant assistance, though mostly through informal support. Al Frente was not included in the formal distribution system set up by United Way and Catholic Charities which was housed at the church. Most of the support for their efforts came from the local Latino community, as well as Latino communities in

the Denver area. Al Frente distributed about 560 food boxes to more than 180 families; they did not ask for verification that families were directly connected to immigrants arrested at the plant. Al Frente also distributed clothing, diapers, infant formula, and other necessities over the first four months following the raid.

The UFCW represented most of the arrested immigrants, as in Grand Island – both Swift plants were unionized. The union hired a lawyer in Boulder to represent immigrants in detention, and the legal team grew to four lawyers and a Spanish-speaking clerk. The legal team represented more than 100 union members who were detained, but they were unable to represent about 20 workers who were not unionized. In addition, almost 100 arrestees – mostly Mexicans – had been deported before any lawyers were able to contact them. Although most of the immigrants who were held in detention received representation through the union's law firm, there were some who – as in Grand Island – received improper representation and lost substantial sums in legal fees. As in Grand Island, the UFCW in Greeley provided assistance with paychecks and compensation for leave.

Mexico and Guatemala both have consulates in Denver, which were very active in service provision following the raids. Although the Mexican Consulate was unable to meet with about 90 of their nationals before they were deported, they were able to meet with about 20 arrestees in detention and put them in contact with their families. The Guatemalan Consulate, however, was able to meet almost all of its 108 nationals in detention. Consular staff gained the release of 14 Guatemalans just after the raid and represented 50 more during hearings later on in the process. Both consulates also sent staff to Greeley to meet with community leaders and affected families at Our Lady of Peace on the day of the raid and at subsequent meetings. At those meetings, consular staff spoke to families to obtain information about who was arrested, made sure that children were not left alone (especially on the day of the raid), and helped refer families to services.* In this way they worked from both ends to put detainees in contact with their families. The Mexican Consulate did not provide direct assistance to families remaining in Greeley, but offered relocation assistance for two families to go back to Mexico; both of these families in the end, however, decided not to relocate.

* For the entire first week after the raid everyone was in the dark about who had actually been arrested. Consular staff had to go to detention facilities and to Greeley to try to obtain information. ICE did not provide them with a complete and accurate list of who had been arrested until two weeks after the raid.

APPENDIX 4

National Estimates of Undocumented Adults and Their Children

A number of key factors influence the number of children potentially affected by ICE's enforcement activities. Primary among these are the industry of parental employment, geographic region of the United States, and parents' country or region of origin. These factors explain the relatively large number of children affected in Greeley and Grand Island compared with New Bedford.

Overall, in 2005 there were 9.3 million unauthorized working-age adults (18-64) and 4.9 million children (ages 0-17) living with these unauthorized adults (Appendix Table).⁴⁵ About half (48%) of these working-age adults had children. They had 1.1 children on average, but more than 80% lived in two-parent families, so there were 2.0 children on average per undocumented family. The ratio of children to undocumented working-age adults was 53% – suggesting that on average there was one child for every two adults.

When only those adults who were actually working are included in the analysis, the share of adults with children drops to 44%, but the average number of children per adult rises to 1.4 because in many immigrant families there are two parents, but only the father works. The number of children per family was also 2.0 on average. Among workers ages 18 to 64, the ratio of children to undocumented adults rises to 63% – suggesting there were almost two children for every three undocumented workers.

Variation in the number of children by parental industry of employment. Most of the largest worksite enforcement actions undertaken by ICE within the past year or so have been in manufacturing plants. Undocumented immigrants working in manufacturing – the industry for all three raid sites included in this study – were more likely to have children than undocumented workers in other major sectors of the economy. Thus, where enforcement activities are focused on manufacturing, there are likely to be more children affected than when enforcement focuses elsewhere.

In 2005, across the major industries of employment for undocumented immigrants, the share of undocumented workers with children ranged from a high of 55% in manufacturing to a low of 38% in construction. Agricultural workers had the most children on average (2.0), followed by construction (1.8); manufacturing workers had 1.6 children on average. The high share of workers with children in manufacturing and the

large number of children per worker on average in agriculture gave these two sectors the highest ratio of children overall per working adult (89%).

Almost two-thirds (63%) of children with undocumented parents working in manufacturing were U.S.-born citizens. Citizen shares of children were similar across all the other major industries except for agriculture where only 43% of children were citizens. Children of undocumented parents working in manufacturing and agriculture were slightly older on average than children of parents in other industries, and the children whose parents worked in construction were slightly younger.

The manufacturing jobs taken by undocumented immigrants tend to be stable, well-paying jobs, at least in contrast to agricultural and service-sector jobs. As a result, as it appears from the 2005 data, undocumented immigrants in manufacturing are more likely than workers in other sectors to have families, and these families are well-established with high shares of U.S.-citizen children as well as older children. Based on the national data, we would expect more than half of undocumented workers in our study sites to have children and for the ratio of children to adults to exceed 80%.

Variations in the number of children by geographic region of the United States. The sites selected for the study were located in three of the nation's four major Census geographic regions: the West, Midwest, and Northeast. The West, with its proximity to the southwestern border with Mexico, has the largest and most well-established undocumented immigrant populations. Undocumented communities in other regions of the country tend to be newer and less well established. The Northeast is the region farthest from the border and has the lowest number of undocumented immigrants, who tend to be more recent arrivals to the region.⁴⁶ Thus, one would expect ICE enforcement activities in the West to affect more children, and those in the Northeast to affect fewer children.

Across the three study regions, undocumented immigrants in the West were the most likely to have children in 2005 (56%), followed by those in the Midwest (46%) and those in the Northeast (42%). The West also had the largest average number of children per worker (1.2) and per family (2.2). The ratio of children to undocumented working-age adults was far higher in the West (65%) than in the other regions. The Northeast had the lowest ratio (41%). In both the Midwest and West, two-thirds of children with undocumented parents were U.S.-born citizens, compared with 56% in the Northeast. Based on these data, we would expect that the workers arrested at the Northeast study site (New Bedford) would have fewer children on average than those arrested in the West and Midwest sites (Greeley and Grand Island).

Variations in the number of children by parental country/region of origin. The two predominant countries of origin for workers arrested at the three study sites were Mexico and Guatemala. Mexico accounts for more than half of all undocumented immigrants, while Guatemala is a much less common country of origin nationally. Mexican immigrants have a long history of undocumented migration to the United States, dating back to the 1960s when the *bracero* temporary agricultural worker program ended. Mexican immigrants legalized in large numbers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.⁴⁷ Guatemalans are a much more recent immigrant group, with the migration stream beginning in earnest during Guatemala's civil war of the 1980s, and increasing in size substantially during the 1990s. The migration of undocumented immigrants from other Central American countries such as Honduras and El Salvador followed a similar pattern, starting in the 1980s and increasing rapidly during the 1990s. As a result of their relative longevity in the United States, one would expect undocumented Mexican immigrants to be more established and therefore more likely to have children than Guatemalans and other Central Americans. As a result, ICE enforcement actions that focus on worksites or communities where there are more Mexican immigrants are likely to affect more children, while those focusing on Central American or other populations are likely to affect fewer children.

In 2005, more than half (53%) of undocumented Mexican immigrants had children, compared with just 41% of Guatemalans. There was little variation in the average number of children per parent by origin, but the overall ratio of children to adults was considerably higher for Mexicans than Guatemalans and other Central Americans (62% compared with 51% and 52%, respectively). A relatively low share of undocumented adults from regions of the world other than Central America had children, and they had fewer children on average, and so their ratio of children to adults was the lowest (41%).

Despite higher shares with children, Mexican immigrant families actually had a lower share of U.S.-citizen children than Guatemalan or other Central American families. About two-thirds (68%) of children with undocumented Mexican parents were citizens, compared with three-quarters (74%-75%) for children with Guatemalan and other Central American parents. Guatemalans also had a relatively high share of children over age ten (43%), but otherwise age distributions were similar across parental origin groups.

Based on the national data, we would expect Mexican immigrants arrested in the study sites to be more likely to have children than Guatemalan and other immigrants, and those sites with higher shares of Mexican immigrants to have more children affected by the

Appendix Table

National Estimates of Undocumented Working-Age Adults and Their Children by Work Status, Industry of Employment, Geographic Region of the United States, and Country/Region of Origin, 2005

			Industry of Employment					
	Total	Working	Manufacturing	Construction	Agriculture	Retail Trade	Services	Entertainment and Leisure
Number of adults (ages 18-64)*	9,281	6,724	974	1,317	246	767	494	1,164
Number of adults with children (ages 0-17)*	4,483	2,992	532	498	109	329	251	477
Percentage of adults with children	48%	44%	55%	38%	44%	43%	51%	41%
Average children per parent	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.5
Average children per family	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.4	1.9	2.0	1.9
Total number of children (ages 0-17)*	4,925	4,251	870	912	219	526	418	730
Ratio of children to adults	53%	63%	89%	69%	89%	69%	85%	63%
Percentage of children:								
U.S.-born citizens	64%	62%	63%	63%	43%	61%	63%	66%
Ages 0 to 5	37%	37%	33%	41%	31%	38%	32%	40%
Ages 6 to 10	28%	28%	25%	28%	25%	24%	32%	29%
Ages 11 to 17	35%	35%	42%	31%	45%	38%	36%	31%

	Geographic Region of the United States				Country or Region of Origin			
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West	Mexico	Guatemala	Other Central America	Other
Number of adults (ages 18-64)*	1,262	980	3,651	3,389	5,133	282	921	2,945
Number of adults with children (ages 0-17)*	532	446	1,611	1,895	2,731	115	414	1,222
Percentage of adults with children	42%	46%	44%	56%	53%	41%	45%	42%
Average children per parent	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.0
Average children per family	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.7
Total number of children (ages 0-17)*	516	450	1,763	2,197	3,207	145	480	1,217
Ratio of children to adults	41%	46%	48%	65%	62%	51%	52%	41%
Percentage of children:								
U.S.-born citizens	56%	66%	63%	66%	68%	74%	75%	50%
Ages 0 to 5	38%	42%	38%	36%	39%	38%	37%	35%
Ages 6 to 10	28%	26%	27%	28%	27%	19%	25%	30%
Ages 11 to 17	34%	32%	34%	37%	34%	43%	38%	35%

*Note: Whole number values expressed in thousands

Source: Urban Institute analysis of March 2005 U.S. Current Population Survey data, augmented with assignments of legal status to noncitizens.

raids. The share of U.S.-born citizen children might be higher in those sites with more Guatemalan and other Central American immigrants.

Reasons for variations in the number of children across the sites. There are several reasons why the shares of arrestees with children and total number of children affected are much lower in New Bedford than in Greeley or Grand Island. First, New Bedford is in the Northeast – the region with the lowest share of undocumented adults with children in the national data discussed earlier. Second, the arrested population in New Bedford is composed almost entirely of Guatemalans and other Central Americans, while arrestees in the other two sites were a mixture of Mexicans and Guatemalans. In the national data, undocumented Mexican immigrants were substantially more likely than Guatemalans and other Central Americans to have children. Third, the workers arrested in New Bedford were much younger than those in the other sites. In New Bedford, 80% of the workers were under age 35, and 42% were under age 25. In fact, four of the arrestees in New Bedford were under the age of 18, and therefore children themselves. Respondents in Greeley and Grand Island told us that the predominant age range for workers was 25 to 45, and that very few workers were under age 25.* Fourth, respondents told us that a substantial share of workers in New Bedford were not married – which is not surprising given their relatively young age – and that among those with children, a high share were single parents. By contrast, virtually all of the families with children in Greeley and Grand Island were two-parent families. Taken together, these three factors suggest that the arrested immigrants in New Bedford were younger, less established, and therefore less likely to have formed families than the arrestees in the other two sites.

Another factor that could influence the share of children is the relatively low wages paid in New Bedford. The average hourly wage at Michael Bianco (\$7-\$9) was much lower than in the Swift plants in the other two sites (\$10-\$15). Moreover, the cost of living is higher in New Bedford than in Greeley or Grand Island, and so the wages at Michael Bianco would make it difficult for an employee to raise a family, especially given that so many were single parents.

* Age data for New Bedford are based on analysis of the list provided by advocates and service providers; age was provided for 349 arrestees. In the other two sites, no such data were available, and the age-range estimates are based on discussions with employers, lawyers, and service providers.

Endnotes

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12. Over the years, Urban Institute and other researchers have developed estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States based on survey data, comparisons with official DHS admissions data, and assumptions about the characteristics of undocumented immigrants versus legal noncitizens. The latest of these estimates – for 2005 – suggest there are just over 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country in total. See Passel, Jeffrey S., *The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.*, *op. cit.*; Passel, Jeffrey S. and Rebecca Clark, *Immigrants in New York: Their Legal Status, Incomes, and Taxes*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1998; and Capps, Randy, Jeffrey S. Passel, Dan Perez-Lopez, and Michael E. Fix, *The New Neighbors: A User's Guide to Data on Immigrants in U.S. Communities*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2003.

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